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ABSTRACT—American criminal justice is in crisis, and most scholars agree 
why: unduly severe laws, mass incarceration, and disproportionate effects on 
minority groups. But they don’t agree on a solution. One group of scholars—
known as the “democratizers”—thinks the answer is to make the criminal 
justice system more democratic. According to democratizers, layperson 
participation and local democratic control will impart sensibility into 
criminal justice reform. In short, a transfer of power away from distant 
lawmakers and toward local communities, which would craft their own 
criminal codes and elect their own prosecutors. This argument assumes that 
more local means more democratic—but what if democratization actually 
threatens democracy?  
Criminal law could be made at the statewide level, the neighborhood 
level, or somewhere in between. And that distinction matters. This Note 
analyzes democratization through the lens of democratic theory, finding that 
the degree to which the criminal lawmaking process is democratic depends 
heavily on the unit of government at which it operates. In other words, the 
critical variable is how local we go. Each level of government creates 
tradeoffs between democratic principles. If criminal law is too localized, it 
unfairly excludes voters from the political process and encourage localities 
to compete in protectionist arms races. On the other hand, if criminal law 
sweeps too broadly, then preferences vary too much among constituents for 
the law to adequately represent any one community’s views. This Note 
argues that “intermediate-level” institutions—counties or regions—are the 
most democratically sound institutions to make and enforce criminal law. 
These institutions, although imperfect, are best able to maximize 
representation while still protecting against the destructive incentives of 
microlocalism. Democratization can be more democratic, but only when it is 
calibrated at the right level. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The American criminal justice system1 is in a dark moment. We punish 
severely,2  disproportionately so when it comes to minorities, 3  which has 
 
 1 The traditional view of the “criminal justice system includes law enforcement, prosecution, defense 
services, the judiciary, and corrections.” Randolph N. Stone, Crisis in the Criminal Justice System, 
8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 33, 33 (1991). 
 2 The incarceration rate in the United States is the highest in the world, despite comparatively low 
crime rates. ROY WALMSLEY, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 2 (12th ed. 2018) (finding that the 
United States incarcerated more than two million people out of its population of 320 million in 2018). 
Another four and a half million were under some other form of correctional control, such as parole or 
probation. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 2 (2018). Our uniquely high incarceration rate has persisted despite the 
steady decline in crime rates since the 1990s. See MELISSA S. KEARNEY, BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, ELISA 
JÁCOME & LUCIE PARKER, HAMILTON PROJECT, TEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND 
INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2014). In fact, the United States has only the fiftieth-highest 
crime rate in the world. WORLD POPULATION REV., CRIME RATE BY COUNTRY 2021 (2021), https:// 
worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/crime-rate-by-country [https://perma.cc/9C5R-PU9Q]. 
The United States also tends to impose lengthier sentences than peer developed nations. JUST. POL’Y 
INST., FINDING DIRECTION: EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING POLICIES OF 
OTHER NATIONS 2 (2011). 
 3 E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2016 5 tbl.3 (2018) (finding that one-third of 
inmates are Black despite only 13% of the national population being Black). One in three Black males is 
statistically likely to go to prison in his lifetime. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PREVALENCE 
OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE UNITED STATES POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003). Neither population 
demographics, nor differential rates of offending, explain these differences. See NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, 
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fostered a lack of trust in law enforcement.4 These issues, and the many 
others plaguing the system,5 were laid bare by widespread protests against 
police brutality during the summer of 2020 and beyond. 6  To no one’s 
surprise, there is a near-universal appetite to alter our criminal justice 
infrastructure.7 But there is nowhere near a consensus on how to do so, owing 
largely to a disagreement over the right level of government to lead criminal 
justice reform.8 This Note tries to identify that level. 
In the debate over who should lead criminal justice reform, scholars 
split into two broad camps: “democratizers” and “bureaucratic 
professionalizers.” 9  Democratizers want to “democratize” the criminal 
justice system by giving the voting public more control over reforms. In their 
view, greater layperson control will inject sensibility into a removed and 
unforgiving criminal justice machine.10 In practice, this includes reforms like 
 
SENT’G PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE 
POLICIES 20–22 (2014), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/race-and-punishment-racial-
perceptions-of-crime-and-support-for-punitive-policies/ [https://perma.cc/WP2J-HFHG]. 
 4 NATHAN JAMES, KRISTIN FINKLEA, NATALIE KEEGAN, KAVYA SEKAR & RICHARD M. THOMPSON 
II, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43904, PUBLIC TRUST AND LAW ENFORCEMENT—A DISCUSSION FOR POLICY 
MAKERS 2 (2018) (finding that only 30% of Black survey respondents and 45% of Hispanic respondents 
had a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police, compared to 61% of white respondents 
(citing Jim Norman, Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average, GALLUP (July 10, 2017), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/213869/confidence-police-back-historical-average.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
DYZ4-2R3K])). 
 5 See Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1370 
(2017) (“The catalogue of dysfunction starts with mass incarceration, prison conditions, policing, and—
the site at which those three lines intersect—racial justice.”). 
 6 The murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and many others sparked worldwide protests 
against police brutality in the summer of 2020. See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A 
Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-
timeline.html [https://perma.cc/4WSJ-DYB3]; Protests Across the Globe After George Floyd’s Death, 
CNN WORLD (June 13, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/06/world/gallery/intl-george-
floyd-protests/index.html [https://perma.cc/S6W8-3ZSQ].  
 7 See, e.g., Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1374–75 (discussing how a wide range of academics, judges, 
practitioners, and politicians agree that criminal justice is in a state of crisis). Indeed, “three-fourths of 
Americans believe the country’s criminal justice system needs significant improvements.” Overwhelming 
Majority of Americans Support Criminal Justice Reform, New Poll Finds, VERA INST. OF JUST. (Jan.  
25, 2018), https://www.vera.org/blog/overwhelming-majority-of-americans-support-criminal-justice-
reform-new-poll-finds [https://perma.cc/WV4L-ZT3Q] (citing ROBERT BLIZZARD, PUB. OPINION 
STRATEGIES, JUSTICE ACTION NETWORK, NATIONAL POLL RESULTS (Jan. 25, 2018), https:// 
www.politico.com/f/?id=00000161-2ccc-da2c-a963-efff82be0001 [https://perma.cc/9JV5-RJBF]). 
 8 See Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1375 (“[W]hen it comes to understanding why the system has 
unraveled and how it could be set right . . . the consensus evaporates and in its place is what can seem 
like a cacophony of conflicting voices.”). 
 9 Id. at 1377, 1399 (coining these terms). 
 10 The 2016 Northwestern University Law Review Symposium on Democratizing Criminal Law 
featured many scholars who identify as democratizers. See, e.g., John Braithwaite, Criminal Justice that 
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plea bargaining juries, community policing, and vesting neighborhood or 
city councils with the power to create substantive criminal law. 11  The 
criminal justice system is broken, according to democratizers, because the 
power to shape criminal law has shifted from voters to distant government 
officials. Unlike local voters, who bear the effects of any changes, these 
officials are incentivized to reduce crime regardless of the cost to individuals 
and communities.12 The democratizers’ remedy is a dose of folk morality: 
give the layperson a greater role in criminal justice decision-making—the 
system should be responsive to us, not out-of-touch bureaucrats. 13 
Bureaucratic professionalizers, or “bureaucratizers,” on the other hand, 
argue that we should vest power in insulated experts who can make more 
informed decisions than the public.14 The criminal justice system is broken, 
according to bureaucratizers, because a vengeful public pressures its not-so-
distant officials to crack down on crime.15 
At the core of this debate is a disagreement over which institution 
should create and implement criminal law through legislation, enforcement, 
 
Revives Republican Democracy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1524 (2017) (arguing that restorative justice 
can revive democracy by giving “direct voice” to those adversely affected in adjudications); R A Duff, A 
Criminal Law We Can Call Our Own?, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1491, 1491–92 (2017) (sketching an “ideal” 
of criminal law grounded in the republican theory of liberal democracy). For a greater discussion of 
democratization and its proposals, see infra Section I.B.  
 11 Joshua Kleinfeld, Laura I. Appleman, Richard A. Bierschbach, Kenworthey Bilz, Josh Bowers, 
John Braithwaite, Robert P. Burns, R A Duff, Albert W. Dzur, Thomas F. Geraghty, Adriaan Lanni, 
Marah Stith McLeod, Janice Nadler, Anthony O’Rourke, Paul H. Robinson, Jonathan Simon, Jocelyn 
Simonson, Tom R. Tyler & Ekow N. Yankah, White Paper of Democratic Criminal Justice, 111 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1693, 1697–1705 (2017) (listing thirty democratization proposals); see also infra notes 80–82 
and accompanying text (discussing how states can delegate criminal lawmaking power to localities). 
 12  See Stephanos Bibas, Restoring Democratic Moral Judgment Within Bureaucratic Criminal 
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1678–79 (2017) (“The most fundamental problem with bureaucratic 
criminal justice is that it has lost sight of why and how We the People should punish. Bureaucratization 
breeds an intense concern for efficiency . . . . That is a recipe for ‘mass incarceration,’ not moral judgment 
or public safety.”). 
 13 Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1397 (suggesting that criminal law should be “more value rational than 
instrumentally rational” by responding “to public deliberation and to the values embedded in the way we 
live together as a culture, rather than” to social-management concerns of institutional bureaucracies). 
 14 See, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 1–3, 168 (2019) (arguing that “[t]he average American citizen is not on equal footing 
with an expert who studies the data in achieving these goals” and that, as a result, citizen choice would 
be less accurate and based on emotion). 
 15 See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[W]e need to change the institutional framework we currently use to make 
criminal justice policy. Instead of policies designed to appeal to the emotions of voters who lack basic 
information about crime, we need to create an institutional structure that creates space for experts who 
look at facts and data to set policies . . . .”); see also Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1376 (“[Bureaucratizers] 
think the root of the present crisis is the outsized influence of the American public—a violent, vengeful, 
stupid, uninformed, racist, indifferent, or otherwise wrongheaded American public—and the solution is 
to place control over criminal justice in the hands of officials and experts.”). 
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and adjudication.16 Yet democratizers have not established the contours of 
which types of power would be transferred to whom.17 The implications of 
who holds the keys to reform are far-reaching, not only for the elected 
branches of state governments and the federal government—which would 
cede power to local governments under the democratizers’ plan18—but also 
for the judicial system. The Supreme Court, for instance, has even relaxed 
Fourth Amendment standards because of the presence of civilian review.19 
Given the implications of community-created laws, it is crucial to 
ensure that these laws are the product of community choice—that 
democratization is actually more democratic. Many democratizers assume 
that more localized governance is more democratic. Such an argument is 
intuitive: localized governments are likely more responsive to voters’ desires 
because they represent a smaller subset of voters who likely have a more 
homogenous set of preferences. 20  This Note challenges that assumption. 
Local control could prove disastrous or a step in the right direction—the 
critical variable is how local we go. 
Other scholars have recently questioned democratization. In his 
comprehensive critique, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal 
Justice, Professor John Rappaport argues that democratization will not fix 
the criminal justice system’s ills and it might even exacerbate them. 21 
Professor Rappaport raises a catalogue of issues with the movement—such 
as its faulty premise that community members have fungible preferences and 
are thus better represented at the local level—and argues that the movement 
 
 16 See John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing” Criminal Justice, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 
711, 813 (2020) (“The critical questions are what values we want our criminal justice system to serve and 
what kind of democracy is likeliest to realize them. The latter question . . . requires us to contemplate how 
best to blend accountability to the public with various kinds of criminal justice expertise. These are 
difficult questions that I put off for another day. But they are ones we should be asking.”). 
 17 See infra Section I.B (discussing the democratizers’ failure to define what community control 
entails). 
 18  See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (discussing how states can delegate criminal 
lawmaking power to localities). 
 19 In Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court considered whether the police’s failure to knock and 
announce their presence before a search implicated the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule—a 
doctrine that prohibits the inclusion of illegally obtained evidence at trial. 547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006). The 
Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule, reasoning that the community itself could hold police 
accountable, thus reducing the need for the exclusionary rule. According to the Court, in a prediction that 
did not age well, “the increasing use of various forms of citizen review can enhance [police] 
accountability,” and so police have little incentive to commit these violations in the first place. Id. at 599. 
 20 See David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 768 (describing the 
widely held view that more localized governments are more responsive to voters). 
 21 Rappaport, supra note 16, at 758. 
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would create more severe criminal law, among other negative externalities.22 
In addition, Elizabeth Janszky canvassed democratization scholarship and 
identified a subset of democratizers she termed “localizers.” Localizers, the 
focus of this Note, want to place power in the hands of local communities in 
particular, rather than increase public participation more generally.23 Like 
Professor Rappaport, Janszky argues that localizing criminal justice leads to 
representational problems because of the lack of political institutions at the 
local level, low voter-turnout rates, and high barriers to entry into local 
political processes.24 
Although previous scholarship touches on the representation and 
accountability concerns created by democratization, it does not offer a 
comprehensive treatment of those issues. This Note fills that void by making 
two main contributions, one narrower and one broader than previous work. 
First, this Note is narrower than previous scholarship because it zeroes 
in on the representation and accountability issues produced by 
democratization, rather than providing a broad critique of democratization’s 
externalities. This Note examines the democratization movement through the 
lens of democratic theory and asks whether democratization is actually more 
democratic. Fundamental to any theory of democracy is the principle that the 
people make basic normative policy choices.25 Political legitimacy therefore 
 
 22 Id. at 719, 739–50, 775 (“A growing comparative literature investigates the determinants of penal 
policies. Nearly all of it suggests that populism makes criminal justice more, not less, severe.”). For 
example, one review of these types of studies comparing many countries found that “a populist view that 
criminal justice policy should be strongly influenced by public sentiment and partisan politics” was a 
notable risk factor of a more punitive criminal system. Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 
36 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (2007). “[A] predominate view that criminal justice policy falls appropriately 
within the province of expert knowledge and professional experience,” on the other hand, was a protective 
factor against such a system. Id. 
 An externality is an economic term for when the benefit (in the case of a positive externality) or a 
cost (a negative externality) of an action or transaction impacts an uninvolved third party. See, e.g., 
Thomas Helbling, Externalities: Prices Do Not Capture All Costs, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Feb. 24, 
2020), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/external.htm [https://perma.cc/875A-QD8H] 
(“In the case of pollution—the traditional example of a negative externality—a polluter makes decisions 
based only on the direct cost of and profit opportunity from production and does not consider the indirect 
costs to those harmed by the pollution.”). The negative externalities this Note is concerned with are the 
negative effects of one locality’s choices about criminal justice policy on other localities. 
 23  See Elizabeth G. Janszky, Note, Defining “Local” in a Localized Criminal Justice System, 
94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1318, 1320 (2019) (“Unlike some democratizers, who care primarily about increasing 
public participation in the criminal system through a variety of means, localizers specifically want to push 
power down into the hands of the ‘local community.’”); see also infra Section I.B (discussing the 
definition of “community”). 
 24 Janszky, supra note 23, at 1337–40. 
 25 Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An 
“Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 761–62 (1989) (“[A] fundamentally democratic 
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depends “primarily on who is to make fundamental policy judgments, rather 
than on what those decisions ultimately are.”26 The most important quality in 
a democratic system is, in other words, self-determination. 27  This Note 
analyzes democratization through a democratic lens, asking to what extent it 
allows for self-determination in the criminal justice system. 
Second, this Note is broader than previous scholarship because it goes 
beyond existing democratization proposals to consider a larger question 
underlying the criminal justice debate: what is the right-sized institution to 
make and enforce criminal law? This Note analyzes the democratic 
implications of criminal lawmaking at three levels of government—
neighborhood, intermediate (regional or county), and state or federal—and 
argues that intermediate institutions are the most democratic institutions to 
lead criminal justice reform. 28  Previous scholarship assumes a false 
dichotomy: lawmaking and enforcement decisions can occur at either a 
broad, statewide or nationwide level or at a hyperlocal level.29 But there is a 
wider range of possibilities. Rather than treating democratization as either 
 
society assumes as its ultimate normative political premise some notion of self-determination, if only 
indirectly through a representational structure.”). This idea is supported in the historical and political 
literature. Tocqueville, for example, stated that “the principle of the sovereignty of the people has 
acquired, in the United States, all the practical development which the imagination can conceive.” ALEXIS 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 51 (Henry Reeve trans., New York, George Adlard 3d Am. 
ed. 1839) (“Whenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of 
the sovereignty of the people that we must begin . . . . In America, the principle of the sovereignty of the 
people is not either barren or concealed . . . it is recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the 
laws . . . .”); see also ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS 
OF THE PEOPLE 9 (1960) (“Governments . . . derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. If 
that consent be lacking, governments have no just powers.”).  
 26 Redish, supra note 25, at 762. 
 27 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 
94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984) (“The essential element of any democratic society is at least some level of 
majoritarian self-determination.”); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 9 
(1982) (“We in the United States are philosophically committed to the political principle that 
governmental policymaking . . . ought to be subject to control by persons accountable to the electorate.” 
(emphasis added)). Self-determination is even a goal of the democratization movement itself. See, e.g., 
Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1697 (“Rules, standards, and institutional practices that violate 
community views of justice . . . should be eliminated from criminal law and procedure unless . . . [they] 
are the only means of promoting an[other] interest that the community agrees to be more important . . . .”). 
 28 The category in which a municipal government falls varies depending on the municipality’s size, 
thus making municipal governments difficult to classify. In smaller cities, municipal governments exhibit 
many of the characteristics of neighborhood governments. See infra Section II.B (discussing 
neighborhood-level governance). Larger city governments may be closer to intermediate institutions, but 
they still lack the ability to capture transient populaces in the way that regional or county governments 
often can. See infra Part III (discussing intermediate-level governance). 
 29 See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 16, at 745 (“[T]he democratizers tend to focus on the microlocal. 
Theirs is a theory of neighborhoods, not cities.”). 
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local or nonlocal, we must consider how democratization affects democratic 
principles across a spectrum of localization.30 
This Note therefore offers a friendly critique to both democratizers and 
bureaucratizers. To democratizers, it suggests a way forward—intermediate 
institutions—that is consistent with their underlying motivation of returning 
power to the people. But it also offers a warning: if democratization is not 
calibrated appropriately, democratization will undermine itself. To 
bureaucratizers, this Note suggests that their critiques unfairly assume 
democratization is a fundamentally narrow proposal. Democratization can 
occur in varying degrees and at varying levels. By focusing on hyperlocal or 
hyperbroad extremes, bureaucratizers ignore the benefits of a potential 
compromise. To be sure, this Note only identifies the “right” institution from 
the perspective of democratic representation and accountability. As 
bureaucratizers point out, factors beyond the scope of this purely democratic 
inquiry should also weigh in the calculus—such as the expertise available to 
each institution or the ability of law enforcement to operate in various 
jurisdictions with different laws.31 The most democratic institution may not, 
at the end of the day, be the most desirable.32 But because democracy is a 
fundamental part of our political system, if we sacrifice democratic ideals to 
achieve other goals, we should at least be aware that we are doing so. 
Part I begins with an overview of the democratization movement. It 
considers the theoretical underpinnings of localization and reviews existing 
democratization proposals, pointing out that “community” lacks a stable 
definition in the existing literature. Parts II and III then measure democracy 
at three levels of government using the three factors most critical to self-
determination in criminal lawmaking: (1) maximization of policy 
preferences, (2) inclusion of voters active in the community, and 
(3) displacement and diffusion. Part II considers control over criminal justice 
at the two levels already considered in previous scholarship—neighborhood 
and state or federal—and catalogues the problems inherent in each. Part III 
considers control over criminal justice at the intermediate level, including 
 
 30 Cf. Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1399 (“[D]emocracy is a ‘more or less,’ not an ‘either/or’ concept.”). 
 31 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 14, at 3 (suggesting that insulated administrative officials should 
lead criminal justice reform because experts are better informed and more rational); cf. Brandon L. 
Garrett, Evidence-Informed Criminal Justice, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490, 1493–94 (2018) (discussing 
how decision-makers have begun relying more on evidence-based methods to improve policing, public 
safety, and the quality of evidence in courtrooms, as well as to reduce incarceration). 
 32 The word “democracy,” of course, is imbued with powerful rhetorical force. See Rappaport, supra 
note 16, at 716. In reality, our political system is full of compromises between democracy and other 
values. The very first words of our Constitution after the preamble sacrifice some democracy for some 
expertise. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1–6 (creating a representative, rather than a direct, democracy). So 
while this Note informs an important aspect of the criminal justice reform debate, it does not claim to 
settle that debate. 
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regional governance, which covers a city and its suburbs, and county 
governance. 33  The three self-determination factors show that the 
intermediate level—the least explored level to date—is the most democratic 
vehicle for criminal justice reform. 
I. WHAT IS COMMUNITY CONTROL? 
Despite its prevalence in democratization literature, the term 
“community” lacks a stable definition. Democratizers sometimes use the 
term to refer to a neighborhood, sometimes a city, and sometimes without 
respect to a unit of government.34 But defining community is vital to any 
discussion of democratization because the term implicates democratic 
principles in different ways, depending on its scope. In general, community-
based democratization proposals seek to place lawmaking and enforcement 
power in the hands of some community smaller than a state.35 While not all 
democratization scholarship is community based, the transfer of power to 
local communities is a large part of the democratization agenda.36 In line with 
previous scholarship, this Note refers to community-based democratizers as 
“localizers.”37 
This Part first discusses the history of community-based 
democratization and then dissects democratization and its proposals in 
greater detail, ultimately identifying a common problem: community is 
seldom defined. 
A. The Theoretical Underpinnings of Community-Based Criminal Law 
While democratization and bureaucratic professionalism are new terms, 
their debate has old roots. The origins of community-based democratization 
are arguably as old as the nation itself. Thomas Jefferson championed 
 
 33 See infra Part III (discussing intermediate-level governance). 
 34 See infra Section I.B. Part of the problem is that “community” is simply difficult to define. Even 
the dictionary definition of “community” is ambiguous about how a community relates to its surrounding 
geographic area. See Community, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
community [https://perma.cc/N9JZ-KYNW] (defining “community” as “a unified body of individuals: 
such as . . . [a group of] . . . people with common interests living in a particular area”).  
 35  See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 729 (“The concept of ‘community’ is central to the 
democratization agenda.”). 
 36 Recall that Janszky defines localizers—those who want to return political power to the community 
level—as only a subgroup of the larger democratization movement. See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1320. 
Indeed, some democratizers are not concerned with local community control. See, e.g., Josh Bowers & 
Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of 
Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 216–19, 233–34 (2012) (suggesting 
that moral credibility be defined at the statewide level and that legitimacy should arguably be evaluated 
at a smaller jurisdictional level—although doing so may not be possible). 
 37 See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1320. 
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“localized, small-scale participatory governance in ‘little republics,’”38 while 
James Madison criticized localism on the grounds that it would lead to a 
tyranny of the majority. According to Madison, without the check of multiple 
competing factions, which is less likely in a smaller-scale government, a 
dominant group would oppress the minority.39 
If Thomas Jefferson is the intellectual grandfather of democratization, 
then Professor Bill Stuntz is its father.40 Professor Stuntz, who would today 
be considered a localizer, desired a return to the Gilded Age—the late 1870s 
to 1929—a time he believed contained “the most egalitarian criminal justice 
in American history,”41 at least outside of the Jim Crow South, where Black 
people were victimized in an anarchic and authoritarian social order.42 This 
period was egalitarian, according to Professor Stuntz, because the “system 
was both more localized and more democratic.”43 Criminal justice decision-
making power was vested in local jurors, local politicians, and in voters from 
the neighborhoods where crime was concentrated. 44  For example, police 
chiefs and prosecutors were selected on a citywide basis during the Gilded 
Age, a time when the big-city machines often determined local nominations. 
Those machines, in turn, depended “on the votes of the working-class 
immigrants whose streets most needed patrolling”—making police and 
prosecutors beholden to the people they were policing and prosecuting.45 
Local communities thus wielded substantially more control than they do 
today—at least until the Great Migration, in which Black people 
concentrated in poor urban neighborhoods and white people fled to suburbs. 
Despite migrating to the suburbs, white people still held more political power 
over urban criminal justice because prosecutors and judges were elected at 
 
 38 Wayne A. Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, 93 IND. L.J. 369, 370 (2018) (quoting Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in 6 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, RETIREMENT 
SERIES, MARCH TO NOVEMBER 1813, at 562–68 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., 2010)). 
 39 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (arguing that one 
dominant faction, which is more likely in small democratic units, would lead to oppression). 
 40 See Kleinfeld, supra note 5, at 1403 (identifying Professor Stuntz as a “founding father of the 
democratization point of view”). 
 41 William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1975 (2008). But see Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and Constitutional Rights, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1045, 
1055 (2013) (arguing that minority communities outside the South were not policed by “their own” and 
often mistrusted police by the end of the Gilded Age). 
 42 Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1983–85. 
 43 Id. at 1975. 
 44 Id. (“In the past, local democratic control of criminal justice appears to have produced equality 
and lenity.”). 
 45 Id. at 1995. 
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the county level.46 But because suburban whites enjoyed historically low 
crime rates, they largely stayed out of criminal justice issues.47 As a result, 
from the 1930s onwards, power drifted away from the voters and to distant 
“professionals and experts”—technocrats not directly elected by the 
people—which “changed the justice system almost entirely for the worse.”48 
If only those in urban neighborhoods where crime rates are highest had the 
ability to control those who govern them, Professor Stuntz argued, criminal 
justice would return to the fairer ways of the Gilded Age.49  
Like Professor Stuntz, localizers today think that government functions 
better when it is responsive to a smaller area with fewer people. Localizers 
offer five main justifications for such a system.50 First, localism gives a 
layperson a greater degree of relative autonomy over political outcomes.51 
Second, local jurisdictions narrowly tailor laws to the needs and interests of 
a community.52 Third, people can “vote with their feet” and move to the 
community that best aligns with their values.53 Fourth, localized government 
increases public participation in the political system. 54  Lastly, localism 
 
 46 See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7 (2011). Counties 
grew to contain populous suburbs, granting these suburbs a greater share of the voting power than inner-
city neighborhoods. See Stuntz, supra note 41, at 1995. 
 47 STUNTZ, supra note 46, at 7, 35. 
 48 Id. at 193–94. 
 49 Stuntz, supra note 41, at 2040 (“[T]he key to a more egalitarian [criminal] justice system is greater 
local control.”); see also id. at 1986–87 (emphasizing a study which found that Black murder defendants 
fared about as well as white murder defendants in Philadelphia during the Gilded Age). 
 50 In the localism literature, the first three justifications are distinct but generally considered under 
the umbrella term of “efficiency.” See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Symposium, Localism and Regionalism, 
48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2000) (categorizing the advantages of localism). 
 51  See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
346, 444 (1990) (arguing that when government operates at a local level, decision-makers are primarily 
concerned with the interests of local residents). 
 52 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 15 (“[L]ocal autonomy permits public policy decisions to match 
distinctive local conditions. If all political decisions were taken at a highly centralized level, it would be 
difficult to vary policies in light of diverse local needs and preferences.”); see also Logan, supra note 38, 
at 375 (“To advocates, a chief virtue of localism lies in its capacity to tailor constitutional norms to local 
needs and preferences, resulting in a possible broadening of constitutional protection.”). 
 53 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) (“[At 
the local level,] the consumer-voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his 
set of preferences.”). This reasoning, however, is flawed—many people do not, and often cannot, move 
solely because of political ideology. See Richard C. Schragger, Federalism, Metropolitanism, and the 
Problem of States, 105 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1548–51, 1557 (2019). 
 54  See Erika K. Wilson, The New School Segregation, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 182 (2016) 
(“Localism purportedly increases citizen participation because the small size of local governments affords 
people opportunity for the exercise of genuine power and decision making. This, in turn, creates more of 
an incentive for citizens to participate in their own governance.”). 
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encourages localities to experiment with policies, which increases 
innovation.55 
In sum, the call of localism is clear when framed relative to larger scale 
governance: align the incentives of the criminal system with those of local 
communities and not with those of states or nations. 
B. Community-Based Proposals and Their Definitional Problem 
Less clear, however, is what localism means in an absolute sense 
because scholars have struggled to define what exactly constitutes a local 
community and, in turn, at which level we should localize to capture the will 
of that community. The lack of a stable definition for “community” presents 
a foundational limitation for democratizers because democratization relies 
heavily on the idea of community preferences.56 Janszky defines localizers 
as those who have “a preference for decentralized, small, local government 
structures, usually at the municipal level.”57 But that could include anything 
from a small neighborhood to a major city or county.58 This Section explores 
the democratizers’ proposals in an attempt to determine what “community” 
means: would democratizers vest power in neighborhoods, cities, or some 
other unit of governance?59 
The blueprint Professor Stuntz laid out for democratization seems, at 
first glance, to be a directive for self-governance at the neighborhood level.60 
While modern democratizers also urge localization, their proposals do not 
always tell us at which level to localize. Even when democratizers do suggest 
a level, they often reach different conclusions or provide unclear definitions. 
 
 55 Logan, supra note 38, at 375 (“Another potential benefit of localism is that it holds promise of 
beneficial experimentation, akin to that envisioned by Justice Brandeis . . . .”). Justice Louis D. Brandeis 
envisioned states having more freedom to engage in social and economic experimentation. See New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 56  See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 729 (“The concept of ‘community’ is central to the 
democratization agenda.”).  
 57 Janszky, supra note 23, at 1326. 
 58 Arizona’s Maricopa County, for example, has 4.4 million residents, making it larger than many 
states. See Maricopa County Quick Facts, MARICOPA CNTY., https://www.maricopa.gov/3598/County-
Quick-Facts [https://perma.cc/7NZB-5YR6]. 
 59 See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1332–33 (“Based on what localizers critique in their scholarship, 
we know what ‘local community’ is not—it is not bureaucracies, state governments, or the federal 
government—but aside from that, it is unclear whether localizers are referring to neighborhoods, 
precincts, cities, or counties.”). 
 60  See Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 1080 (“More central to Stuntz’s book, however, is its ambition 
to restore political power to local neighborhoods.”). But as Professor Stephen Schulhofer points out, 
Professor Stuntz does not explain how power should be given back to the community. The closest 
Professor Stuntz comes is proposing that we draw juries from neighborhoods where crime happens. 
Otherwise, Professor Stuntz proposed leaving decision-making power in the same place: with actors, such 
as district attorneys and judges, who are elected on a citywide or countywide basis. Id. at 1080–81. 
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Most notably, a large group of democratizers wrote a white paper 
proposing criminal justice reforms.61 They argue that criminal justice should 
be more “community-focused and responsive to lay influences,” 62  and 
twenty-two of their thirty proposals hinge on community views to some 
extent. 63  For example, they suggest decriminalizing crimes that are not 
considered wrongful according to “community views of justice,”64 creating 
citizen advisory boards that would draw members from the community to 
advise legislators and police,65 and redrawing prosecutorial districts to make 
prosecutors “responsive to smaller and more cohesive communities.” 66 
Despite relying on the idea of community, the white paper does not define 
what a community is, whom a community includes, or which values a 
community holds. It does not explain, for example, whose views we should 
consult in decriminalizing offenses or which type of locality we should draw 
prosecutorial districts around.  
Some democratization literature has admittedly proposed solutions that 
include a definition of the community at issue. After suggesting that 
“localities” make greater use of criminal laws, Professor Lauren Ouziel 
identifies localities as cities. She then offers two lawmaking avenues: a city 
could craft criminal ordinances itself, or a state could create criminal laws 
that apply only to certain cities. 67  By contrast, Professor Christopher 
Slobogin defines communities as neighborhoods and proposes that 
neighborhood councils should approve surveillance systems before they are 
installed in a neighborhood.68 
For the most part, however, the suggested unit of governance is unclear. 
For example, Professor Richard Bierschbach proposes “[p]ushing more 
criminal justice power—legislative, enforcement, adjudicative, and penal—
down to directly affected communities and neighborhoods” before 
suggesting that “[c]ity councils . . . be given real power to craft their own 
 
 61 See Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1697–1705. 
 62 Id. at 1694 (emphasis added). 
 63  Id. at 1697–1705. Eighteen proposals explicitly reference the “community.” Four more 
proposals—pertaining to grand juries, equitable trial juries, and sentencing juries—are explained in an 
earlier proposal to incorporate community viewpoints. Id. at 1697 (“All juries, including grand, trial, and 
sentencing juries, should be drawn from within the immediate, local community in which the crime was 
committed . . . .”). 
 64 Id. at 1698.  
 65 Id. at 1699–1700. 
 66 Id. at 1702. 
 67 Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123 YALE L.J. 2236, 
2323–24 (2014) (“With respect to lawmaking, localities should consider more robust use of local laws.”). 
 68 Christopher Slobogin, Community Control over Camera Surveillance: A Response to Bennett 
Capers’s Crime, Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 993, 996–97 (2013). 
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substantive criminal codes.” 69  He does not explain whether both 
neighborhoods and cities should exercise legislative power, whether these 
proposals are mutually exclusive, or whether cities should create laws that 
apply uniquely to certain neighborhoods. The answers to such questions raise 
important implications for major cities, where the differences between 
neighborhood and municipal control are sizable. In a different article, 
Professor Bierschbach and then-Professor Stephanos Bibas support 
community control at the county level. They do so by defending the 
California Public Safety Realignment Act, which transferred inmates from 
the state prison system to county jails and gave counties discretion—over 
both incarceration and parole—to craft policies according to their “local 
priorities, preferences, and needs.”70  
Relatedly, Professor Laura Appleman advocates for community 
prosecution, community courts, and community policing.71 Under Professor 
Appleman’s plan, prosecutors would be assigned to, but not elected by, 
specific neighborhoods. Yet Professor Appleman does not define the level at 
which community policing would operate, only stating that it should 
“establish partnerships” with local residents.72  
Lastly, some democratizers even argue that courts should afford 
constitutional deference to locally crafted laws. 73  In City of Chicago v. 
Morales, the Supreme Court struck down an antiloitering ordinance that the 
City of Chicago enacted to combat gang crime, finding the ordinance 
unconstitutionally vague.74 “The ordinance was to be enforced only after 
consultation with ‘local leaders’ and ‘community organizations,’” something 
that Professors Dan Kahan and Tracey Meares think is crucial.75 They argue 
 
 69 Richard A. Bierschbach, Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment, 
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1452 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 70 Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing Equality?, 102 VA. 
L. REV. 1447, 1503–07 (2016). 
 71 Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration: Cash-Register Justice in the Criminal 
System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1529–33 (2016). 
 72 Id. Professor Appleman’s proposal might allow prosecutors and judges to tailor their actions to a 
community, but if judges are appointed or elected on a statewide level, the proposal may not necessarily 
increase community control. 
 73  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal 
Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998) (arguing that judges should evaluate community policing 
under relaxed scrutiny “when they are confident that the political community has meaningfully 
internalized the burden that such policing puts on individual liberty”). 
 74 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (“In our judgment . . . the ordinance does not provide sufficiently specific 
limits on the enforcement discretion of the police ‘to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and 
clarity.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997))). 
 75 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 73, at 1183 (“Enforcement of the ordinance was implemented 
through regulations that clearly specified who counted as a ‘gang member,’ what kinds of behavior 
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that because the ordinary citizen’s “decisions about the appropriate balance 
between liberty and order” deserve respect, the Court should have granted 
deference to community views when evaluating the ordinance.76 The Court 
never addressed that argument, but there is some evidence the Justices might 
be open to revisiting the issue. Six years after Morales, in Hudson v. 
Michigan, the Court applied a relaxed standard of the Fourth Amendment’s 
exclusionary rule—a doctrine that prohibits the inclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence at trial.77 The Court held that the police’s failure to knock 
and announce their presence did not mandate the suppression of all evidence 
obtained in their search, in part because of “evidence that the increasing use 
of various forms of citizen review can enhance police accountability,” which 
apparently reduces the likelihood that police will violate the Amendment.78 
In sum, although many scholars call for localized criminal law, they 
have not reached a consensus on the appropriate level of localization. A 
survey of the literature reveals proposals ranging from the neighborhood 
level to the county level. The democratizers have a clear aim in a relative 
sense—government smaller than the state or federal level—but not in an 
absolute sense. The choice over which level to localize at, however, has 
dangerous implications for democracy. 
II. MEASURING DEMOCRACY 
Despite their calls for community-based lawmaking and enforcement, 
democratizers have not identified the level of government in which 
lawmaking and enforcement decisions should be made. But this choice is 
critical to the amount of representation and accountability accompanying 
criminal justice reform. To operationalize this inquiry into which political 
institution optimizes representation and accountability, Parts II and III 
examine the democratic implications of criminal lawmaking and 
enforcement at three levels of government: neighborhood, county or region, 
and state or federal. There is no panacea, as each institution creates unique 
tradeoffs between certain democratic values, but some institutions are more 
democratic than others. If we were to assign a hypothetical democracy score 
to each level of government, the intermediate level—county and regional 
governments—would earn the highest score.  
Two things constrain the scope of this analysis. First, this Note 
examines each level of government only through the perspective of 
 
counted as ‘loitering,’ which officers could enforce the law, and in what neighborhood areas it could be 
enforced.”).  
 76 Id. 
 77 547 U.S. 586, 597, 599 (2006). 
 78 Id. at 599. 
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democratic representation and accountability. There are sound arguments for 
and against localization that are beyond this basic democratic inquiry.79 
Take, for instance, the possibility of discrimination. This Note concludes that 
county or regional legislatures are the most democratic institutions, but a 
shift to these institutions could have serious implications for racial minorities 
in majority-white areas. Recall that Professor Stuntz praised the Gilded Age 
as the most egalitarian time in U.S. history outside the South—but what 
about the South? A localized criminal justice system can pose serious 
discrimination risks, which should not be ignored. This Note focuses only on 
democracy—an important, but not dispositive, factor in criminal justice 
reform. 
Second, the Constitution vests most criminal lawmaking authority in 
the states by virtue of their police powers.80 States can delegate that power to 
localities, but localities have only the powers granted to them by the state 
under state constitutional “home rule.”81 So even if, as a normative matter, a 
locality should exercise criminal lawmaking and enforcement powers, it may 
still lack such powers. Some state constitutions even explicitly prohibit 
delegating criminal lawmaking powers to local government, 82  although 
localities may be able to functionally modify state law through 
nonenforcement.83 The practical realities presented by each state constitution 
are beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, this Note asks if there is an ideal 
institution from the standpoint of democratic representation. That answer 
should then inform our judgments of these state constitutional provisions. 
 
 79 For example, bureaucratizers would heavily value the level of expertise available to lawmakers at 
each level of government. See, e.g., BARKOW, supra note 14, at 1–3, 168 (arguing that experts arrive at 
more accurate decisions than laypeople). 
 80 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (reserving for the states “powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 599 (2000) (“[T]here is no better 
example of the police power . . . than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.”). 
 81 Shawn E. Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 468 (2020) (“[A local 
government’s] power is traditionally limited to those specifically enumerated in its respective state 
constitution . . . . These limited powers . . . are often referred to as ‘home rule’ powers.”). This 
relationship functions much like the inverse of the states’ relationship with the federal government. There, 
the federal government has a limited set of enumerated powers, with the rest reserved for the states and 
the people. See Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1990–91 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(describing federalism principles). But here, states have general police powers, with only a set of 
enumerated powers reserved to localities in their state constitutions. Fields, supra, at 468. 
 82 See, e.g., JOHN MARTINEZ, 1 LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 4:7, Westlaw (database updated May 
2021) (noting that the South Dakota Constitution, for example, “gives local governments general power 
to legislate on any subject except private relationships and criminal laws”).  
 83 Much as how “sanctuary cities” resist federal immigration laws, some localities are refusing to 
enforce state gun-control measures. See Christopher N. Lasch, R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina 
Francesca Haynes, Annie Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick & Juliet P. Stumpf, Understanding “Sanctuary 
Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1710–11 (2018); Fields, supra note 81, at 485–89 (describing how some 
localities could resist state gun-control laws through nonenforcement). 
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Section II.A identifies and defines three factors that measure the 
democratic credentials of criminal law institutions. Section II.B then applies 
these factors to neighborhood institutions, and Section II.C applies them to 
state or federal institutions. 
A. Defining the Three Factors of Democratic Representation 
To assess the democratic strength of each level of government, we need 
tools that measure democratic principles in a criminal law context. Self-
determination—the idea that voters should exercise control over the laws that 
affect them—begs two fundamental questions. First, can voters control 
which laws are enacted by electing candidates who share their preferences? 
Second, are the voters affected by those laws? This Note operationalizes 
these questions into three factors: (1) preference maximization, (2) inclusion, 
and (3) displacement and diffusion.84 These factors have never before been 
applied to a democratic inquiry into criminal law, but they derive from the 
localist and regionalist literatures, which have long recognized their value.85 
Each factor contributes to “allocational efficiency,” in which districts are 
drawn so that the political process best represents as many people as it can.86 
In turn, this Note assumes that the most democratically sound institution to 
make and enforce criminal law is the institution that best optimizes these 
factors. 
First, “preference maximization” refers to the idea that voters are better 
represented when jurisdictions group together like-minded voters. This 
factor measures the likelihood that voters can control which laws are 
enacted. If we draw districts around people who tend to agree, then districts 
can more easily maximize the policy preferences of their voters.87 Suppose 
three jurisdictions each want to take a different approach to criminal justice. 
If laws are made at a centralized level governing all three, then two outcomes 
are possible: the preferences of one jurisdiction will win out to the detriment 
of the other two jurisdictions, or the centralized government will reach a 
compromise that only partially satisfies each jurisdiction. In either scenario, 
two or all three of the jurisdictions will not be completely satisfied with the 
outcome. But if each jurisdiction can instead make its own laws, then each 
 
 84 While there are undoubtably other factors that measure how democratic an institution is, such as 
interest-group influence, I believe these factors measure the most fundamental elements of self-
determination in criminal law. Throughout this Note, I sometimes refer to the third factor only as 
displacement for concision.  
 85 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text. 
 86 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 15–16. 
 87  See Erin Adele Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State–Local Relationship?, 
106 GEO L.J. 1469, 1491 (2018); see also Briffault, supra note 50, at 15 (arguing that decentralization 
allows local governments to tailor laws to the needs of their voters). 
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can pass laws tailored to its own preferences. Of course, democracy always 
produces winners and losers—some voters will still find themselves in the 
minority, no matter how efficiently we draw districts. 88  But preference 
maximization measures whether a democratic structure is producing the 
most winners possible.  
Second, “inclusion” stands for the idea that those who have an interest 
in a jurisdiction’s criminal laws should be able to vote for the officials that 
enact and enforce those laws. In other words, inclusion measures whether 
voters have a say in the laws that affect them.89 For example, if a voter spends 
significant time in a jurisdiction or owns property in a jurisdiction, inclusion 
might suggest that she should have a vote in that jurisdiction, even if she is 
not formally a resident there. 
Third, “displacement” addresses the idea that criminal behavior is not 
static. Like inclusion, this factor measures whether voters have a say in the 
laws that affect them, but from a different perspective—namely, that 
attempts to address crime in one jurisdiction can have spillover effects in 
neighboring jurisdictions that the neighboring voters never voted for. 90 
People engage, at least in part, in a cost–benefit analysis when deciding 
whether to commit a crime.91 One jurisdiction raising the costs of committing 
a crime—by increasing the probability of detection or the severity of the 
expected sanction—might deter a person from committing crime in that 
jurisdiction. This makes nearby jurisdictions that have not imposed similar 
costs relatively more attractive destinations for criminal activity.92 Research 
 
 88 See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) (“Some 
candidate, along with his supporters, always loses.”). 
 89 Inclusion naturally follows from the premise that the people should make basic normative policy 
choices because to make such choices, people must be able to vote on the policies affecting them. See 
Redish, supra note 25, at 762–64. 
 90 Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional 
Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1839 (2005) (“[J]urisdictions may shift criminal activity to 
neighboring jurisdictions . . . by affecting the ex ante decision about where to commit certain crimes.”). 
The type of displacement at issue here is known as spatial displacement, meaning that offenders switch 
from targets in one location to targets in another location. Other types of displacement, such as target 
displacement (offenders change from one type of target to another) and temporal displacement (offenders 
change the time at which they commit the crime) also exist but are not relevant here. See ROB T. 
GUERETTE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY.-ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., ANALYZING CRIME 
DISPLACEMENT AND DIFFUSION 3 (2009). 
 91 Teichman, supra note 90, at 1829. 
 92 See id. at 1839–40. 
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has shown this pattern with respect to robbery93 and prostitution,94 although 
displacement does not always occur after the costs of committing crime 
increase.95 
Social scientists have also observed the opposite effect, known as 
“diffusion.” Diffusion is the reduction of crime in one nearby area because 
of a targeted response in another—what one neighborhood does about crime 
can deter criminal activity in other neighborhoods.96 Even though diffusion 
appears to provide a benefit to neighboring voters, both displacement and 
diffusion conflict with self-determination.97 Displacement does so because 
voters experience higher crime in their jurisdiction as a result of criminal 
justice policies for which they did not vote. Diffusion, though seemingly a 
positive byproduct, also harms self-determination because it strips voters in 
the affected jurisdiction of the right to calibrate their own criminal-
punishment regime. Lower crime rates carry a cost, and the affected 
jurisdiction might not want to lower crime rates at the cost of harsher 
penalties and locking up its own.98 
In sum, three factors—preference maximization, inclusion, and 
displacement and diffusion—best measure the democratic credentials of 
criminal lawmaking and enforcement institutions. The rest of Part II and Part 
III apply these factors to three broad levels of government and reveal that 
intermediate institutions best handle the representational tradeoffs made in 
criminal lawmaking and enforcement. 
 
 93 See Christian Grandjean, Bank Robberies and Physical Security in Switzerland: A Case Study of 
the Escalation and Displacement Phenomena, 1 SEC. J. 155, 157–58 (1990). But see Anthony A. Braga, 
David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William Spelman & Francis Gajewski, 
Problem-Oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment, 
37 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 567–69 (1999) (finding problem-oriented policing interventions do not lead to 
displacement of robbery calls and incidents). 
 94 Phil Hubbard, Community Action and the Displacement of Street Prostitution: Evidence from 
British Cities, 29 GEOFORUM 269, 278–80 (1998).  
 95  Some studies found “considerable evidence of spatial displacement . . . as a result of police 
crackdowns, especially during drug enforcement.” Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Limits of Hot Spot 
Policing, in POLICE INNOVATION: CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 252–53 (David Weisburd & Anthony A. 
Braga eds., 2006). But a comprehensive review found displacement only in 23% percent of instances. 
Rob T. Guerette & Kate J. Bowers, Assessing the Extent of Crime Displacement and Diffusion of Benefits: 
A Review of Situational Crime Prevention Evaluations, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1331, 1346–47 (2009). 
 96 The same comprehensive review that found displacement in nearly one-quarter of instances found 
diffusion in 37% percent of instances. Guerette & Bowers, supra note 95, at 1334, 1346. 
 97 See Redish, supra note 25, at 761–62 (describing self-determination). 
 98 See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text. 
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B. Neighborhood Institutions 
The purest application of the democratization agenda is neighborhood-
level control.99 From the perspective of self-determination, neighborhood-
level control is also the most dangerous application because it excludes 
relevant voters from the process and displaces crime to nearby 
neighborhoods. Adding to this, it is not even clear that neighborhood-level 
control produces its purported benefit: preference maximization. 
Neighborhood-level control could take two forms. The first is 
neighborhood self-governance, whereby neighborhood residents create their 
own criminal codes and enforcement policies through elected representatives 
or popular vote. The most obvious example of neighborhood self-
governance is an elected neighborhood council, but other proposals—such 
as neighborhood-level prosecutorial elections—also fall into this category.100 
The second form neighborhood-level control could take is state-level 
governance tailored to certain neighborhoods, where a state legislature 
makes legislative and enforcement decisions that apply uniquely to certain 
neighborhoods according to the so-called will of those neighborhoods.101 
As a practical matter, the second form is easier to implement because 
many neighborhoods lack existing governments. 102  And even where 
neighborhood governments do exist, they are presently unfit to democratize 
criminal law. For example, Los Angeles, which boasts an extensive array of 
neighborhood councils, is one of the rare exceptions to the lack of 
neighborhood governments throughout the country. Supporters praise the 
city’s neighborhood-council system because it aims to increase minority 
 
 99 See STUNTZ, supra note 46, at 6–8 (arguing that urban neighborhoods must take back control over 
criminal justice decision-making in order for “criminal justice . . . to grow more just”). But a 
neighborhood, like a community, is inherently difficult to define. The term describes many things in the 
English language, including groups of houses, the area surrounding a local institution like a church, or 
political wards and precincts. What Is a Neighborhood?, DATA CTR., https://www.datacenterresearch.org/ 
data-resources/neighborhood-data/what-is-a-neighborhood/ [https://perma.cc/EAN3-JBCE]. This Note 
uses the term “neighborhood” to refer to subsections of a city that are formally recognized by a city 
government as “neighborhoods” in a political or social context. See, e.g., Chicago Ward, Community 
Area and Neighborhood Maps, CITY OF CHI., https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/dgs/supp_info/ 
citywide_maps.html [https://perma.cc/C3VC-XDH9] (showing neighborhoods recognized by the 
Chicago Office of Tourism). But just as political and social boundaries can change, so too can 
neighborhood names and boundaries. 
 100 See Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1697–1705 (listing reforms). 
 101 See, e.g., Ouziel, supra note 67, at 2323 (proposing state criminal laws that apply uniquely to 
certain cities). 
 102 See Janszky, supra note 23, at 1337 (“Many neighborhoods (especially in big cities), for instance, 
do not have any political institutions governing them.”). 
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participation, although the councils have had mixed success in practice.103 
But even Los Angeles’s neighborhood councils are “advisory-only” 
institutions, meaning they lack the ability to make law—instead, they craft 
ordinances subject to the approval of the mayor.104 Because neighborhood 
governments are rare and the few that do exist lack criminal lawmaking 
powers, if criminal law does move toward neighborhood control, decisions 
will likely continue to be made at the state or city level by virtue of inertia. 
This presents serious risks for self-determination because state- or city-level 
governance that applies uniquely to certain neighborhoods is also the most 
dangerous iteration of neighborhood control from a representational and 
accountability perspective.105 
The following three Sections assess the first form of neighborhood 
control, neighborhood self-governance, against the self-determination 
factors: preference maximization, inclusion, and displacement. The fourth 
Section then turns to the second form of neighborhood-level control, state- 
or city-level governance tailored to specific neighborhoods, which carries 
risks distinct from neighborhood governments. 
1. Preference Maximization 
Professor Rappaport identified a key premise of the democratization 
movement: people live in homogenous communities that have distinct and 
identifiable views of criminal justice. 106  If this were true, neighborhood 
 
 103 See Erwin Chemerinsky & Sam Kleiner, Federalism from the Neighborhood Up: Los Angeles’s 
Neighborhood Councils, Minority Representation, and Democratic Legitimacy, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 569, 577 (2014) (describing the key advantage of the councils as “their ability to bring traditionally 
under-represented communities into the political process”). But in practice, the council system has had 
mixed success in increasing minority participation. See Douglas Houston & Paul M. Ong, Determinants 
of Voter Participation in Neighborhood Council Elections, 41 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 
686, 688–99 (2012) (finding that Asian Americans and Latinos participate in the councils at lower levels 
than non-Hispanic whites and African Americans). In addition, extremely local governments, like Los 
Angeles’s city councils, come with dangers of their own. See Elliot Louthen, Note, Prerogative and 
Legislator Vetoes, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 589–91 (2020) (describing Los Angeles council members’ 
use of a hyperlocal “legislator veto” to block affordable housing developments in their districts). Besides 
neighborhood councils, there are some other existing microlocal governance structures, like business-
improvement districts or school boards, but none exist for the purpose of making decisions about criminal 
law. See Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323, 1336–49 (2014) (describing two types 
of “micro-local” structures: school districts and historic districts); Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal 
Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. REV. 503, 509–21 (1997) (describing four types of 
economically focused “sublocal” structures: enterprise zones, tax increment finance districts, special 
zoning districts, and business-improvement districts). 
 104 See Chemerinsky & Kleiner, supra note 103, at 574 (explaining that the councils can only advise 
the city and therefore have a limited role in formal decision-making). 
 105 See infra Section II.B.4. 
 106 Rappaport, supra note 16, at 739 (discussing how democratizers presume “that Americans reside 
in reasonably cohesive communities that are capable of forming and expressing . . . ‘community values’ 
and ‘community views’ of justice”). 
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governments would maximize preferences.107 Yet there is little evidence that 
this level of agreement exists at the neighborhood level. For example, 
neighborhoods today are more racially heterogeneous than the democratizers 
acknowledge. Racial segregation, while still high, is sharply lessening.108 
The democratizers’ idea of protecting minorities by empowering the inner-
city neighborhoods they live in109 does not reflect reality. As of 2016, 52% 
of Black Americans in the country’s largest metropolitan areas live in the 
surrounding suburbs of those areas.110 In fact, only 42% of Black Americans 
live in majority-Black neighborhoods as of 2016. 111  And even racially 
homogenous neighborhood residents possess divergent interests according 
to class and age.112 Whatever a community is today, it is not necessarily a 
neighborhood.113 
Some democratizers point to a body of research that has found “a high 
degree of agreement about judgments of justice across all demographics,” at 
least for “the core of wrongdoing.”114 But as Professor Rappaport pointed 
out, there are two significant problems with this finding. First, the finding 
overstates the degree of lay consensus on criminal justice issues because it 
only shows that people uniformly oppose the very worst crimes, such as 
murder or rape, but not that people agree on what kind of behavior constitutes 
these crimes.115 Second, although the research finds that people agree on how 
severely offenses should be punished in a relative sense—in ranking offenses 
 
 107  See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (“Decentralization allows local bodies to tailor services, regulation, 
and taxation to the needs and desires of their particular constituents . . . . [L]ocal autonomy can increase 
the ability of government to respond to those preferences.”). 
 108 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI L. REV. 
1329, 1343–48 (2016) (surveying evidence on racial segregation). 
 109 See, e.g., Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 3 UTAH L. 
REV. 543, 566 (2014) (“A democracy-enhancing theory of criminal law . . . prioritiz[es] the 
empowerment of low-income and minority individuals and communities to participate more fully in the 
formation and implementation of criminal justice policies.”). 
 110 Alana Semuels, No, Most Black People Don’t Live in Poverty—or Inner Cities, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/10/trump-african-american-inner-city/ 
503744/ [https://perma.cc/YDE3-84KH]. 
 111 Paul Jargowsky, Are Minority Neighborhoods a Disaster?, CENTURY FOUND., (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://tcf.org/content/commentary/minority-neighborhoods-disaster [https://perma.cc/F6AT-YCE5]. 
 112 See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 745–47. 
 113  See supra Section I.B (discussing the difficulty in defining “community”); see also STEVE 
HERBERT, CITIZENS, COPS, AND POWER: RECOGNIZING THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY 12 (2006) (finding 
that “many people do not understand community as spatially bounded; urban residents often seek 
community outside their neighborhood”). 
 114 Paul H. Robinson, Democratizing Criminal Law: Feasibility, Utility, and the Challenge of Social 
Change, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2017) (reviewing the literature on community views of criminal 
justice). 
 115 Rappaport, supra note 16, at 743–44. 
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in order of severity—it does not find that they agree on the absolute level of 
punishment that should accompany each offense.116  
There is also a third problem: even if we accept the research as true, it 
would not support localization. The researchers argue there is a consensus 
among people “across all demographics” without accounting for 
geography.117 But if people share similar views on criminal justice no matter 
where they live, then localized control would not better represent them 
because people already share similar views at the state or federal level. For 
example, if 60% of voters in a state support a reform measure and 60% of 
voters within a particular neighborhood support that same measure, 
neighborhood-level governance would not better maximize voter 
preferences as compared to state-level governance. Lessening the size of 
government will logically only maximize preferences when the smaller units 
of a larger body have distinct views from the aggregate views of the larger 
body. But, as discussed, there is little evidence of these conditions at the 
neighborhood level.118 Of course, some hyperlocal areas likely exist where 
people do share higher levels of agreement on criminal justice policies than 
all voters within a city or state do when considered as a whole. Yet even if 
preference maximization is possible in some instances of neighborhood-
level governance, the other two factors measuring self-determination—
inclusion and displacement or diffusion—counsel against neighborhood 
governance. 
2. Inclusion 
Although neighborhood-level governance may appear closer to 
voters,119  it is both overinclusive and underinclusive. Drawing boundary 
lines around neighborhoods would both exclude from the political process 
nonresidents with an interest in a locality’s criminal lawmaking and 
enforcement decisions and include residents without an interest in such 
decisions.  
In the United Sates, a person’s ability to vote and run for office in a 
jurisdiction often depends on her residency in that jurisdiction.120 The people 
 
 116 Id. 
 117 See Robinson, supra note 114, at 1567. 
 118 I have found no research showing these conditions at the neighborhood level. But ample evidence 
of these conditions exists at the intermediate level. See infra Part III (describing intermediate institutions). 
 119 See Schleicher, supra note 20, at 763. 
 120 See Eugene D. Mazo, Residency and Democracy: Durational Residency Requirements from the 
Framers to the Present, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 611, 632 (2016) (“Most states impose durational residency 
requirements on both voters and political candidates, but the individuals affected, the period of duration 
required, and the justifications given for each of these distinct durational residency requirements differ 
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who vote for and serve on a neighborhood council would thus be residents 
of that neighborhood. But a residency requirement on such a small scale is 
based on an anachronistic premise. We no longer live in colonial villages 
where we can hop from the general store, skip to the tavern, and jump 
home.121 Instead, people today work, live, and socialize across many small 
areas that they are not necessarily residents in.122 So while neighborhood 
governments are closer to the people, they are not necessarily closer to the 
people they should be representing. 
Neighborhood-level voting is both overinclusive and underinclusive. 
Imagine two people: one resident of a neighborhood and one nonresident. 
The resident is a student who spends all her time in another jurisdiction but 
still lists her parents’ address in the neighborhood as her voting address.123 
The nonresident works, shops, and socializes in the neighborhood but cannot 
afford to live in it. Why should the resident—but not the nonresident—have 
a say in the neighborhood’s criminal justice policies? In fact, we would 
expect a mirror image of such a result in a representational democracy. 
Neighborhood governance presents a political process that represents us in 
some parts of our lives, namely where we reside, but not others, undermining 
a core premise of both representational democracy and the democratization 
movement: people should have a say in the normative policy choices that 
affect them. Issues with inclusion can of course arise even when 
jurisdictional boundaries are larger because some people will inevitably live 
near borders and spend time in multiple jurisdictions, but as explained in 
 
significantly.”); see also Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978) (holding that 
voting may be restricted to residents of a locality); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 253, 319–20 (1993) (“Local government law . . . gives priority to a single place-bite within the 
metropolitan area: the place where people live. Indeed, residency has always been at the center of local 
government law’s conception of people’s relationship to the space around them.”). Some scholars, 
however, have suggested voting schemes not based on residency requirements. See, e.g., id. at 329 
(proposing a system that gives each person five votes to use in “whatever local elections they feel affect 
their interest”); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1909 (1994) (proposing that we give all residents of a city or state the ability 
to vote in all local elections). 
 121 See Frug, supra note 120, at 320 (conceding that “[p]erhaps this emphasis on residency was 
justifiable when . . . home, work, family, friends, [and] market” were all in one community). 
 122 Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 421 (2001) (“[P]eople . . . 
conduct their lives across various political and social communities everyday, working in one, playing in 
another, going to school in another, sleeping in another, and voting in another.”). Professor Frug argues 
that the residency requirement “romanticizes the home as a haven in a heartless world.” Frug, supra note 
120, at 320 (citing CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 
(1977)). Because “[m]ost people spend most of their day in other parts of the region . . . . a person’s 
territorial identity should not be reduced to his or her address.” Id. 
 123 For additional context, see Frug, supra note 120, at 320 (“But these days some people do not even 
live at their place of residence: students who spend full-time out-of-state, people who are serving in the 
military, and business-people who are assigned abroad are all residents of the town they are never in.”). 
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Section III.B, inclusion problems are more likely to arise in a smaller 
jurisdiction. 
3. Displacement and Diffusion 
Since criminal law is not static, localized jurisdictions also present 
another set of problems. One neighborhood’s approach to criminal law can 
affect—through displacement and diffusion—crime in nearby 
neighborhoods.124 As Professor Rappaport put it, “The democratizers’ vision 
of . . . America . . . ignores the critical ways in which neighborhoods 
themselves are interconnected.” 125  This interconnectedness creates two 
related problems. 
First, as previously discussed in Section II.A, displacement and 
diffusion conflict with self-determination. Imagine Neighborhood A votes to 
increase criminal penalties for robbery, which displaces robbery crime to 
Neighborhood B. The residents of Neighborhood A have functionally made 
a policy choice for the residents of Neighborhood B, who did not choose to 
accept the consequential risk of increased crime. The same criticism applies 
to diffusion, even though diffusion reduces crime in nearby neighborhoods. 
If Neighborhood A enacts harsher penalties that diffuse crime away from 
Neighborhood B, it still impinges upon the ability of Neighborhood B’s 
residents to calibrate their own criminal justice policies because 
Neighborhood B’s residents did not participate in the democratic process that 
led to the decision causing such an effect.126 Imagine those in Neighborhood 
B wish to take a reformist approach and rehabilitate offenders in their 
neighborhood, rather than locking them up. Maybe they want to take a step 
back from the War on Drugs and break the unjust cycle of mass 
incarceration.127 Neighborhood B can still formally enact its own policies, 
but it does so against a landscape largely determined by another 
jurisdiction—especially if Neighborhood A is imprisoning Neighborhood 
B’s own residents for crimes committed while visiting Neighborhood A.128 
What may seem like a windfall for Neighborhood B from the perspective of 
crime control is not a windfall from the perspective of many of the other 
 
 124 See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text.  
 125 Rappaport, supra note 16, at 757. 
 126  Schragger, supra note 122, at 444–45 (“The spillover effects of local decisions undermine 
localism not because those outsiders who are affected have not contracted into the norms . . . but because 
[they] have not been included in the democratic process that preceded adoption of those norms.”). 
 127 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 2–9 (2010) (describing how mass incarceration leads to a system of racialized social 
control similar to that of the Jim Crow era). 
 128 See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing inclusion). 
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considerations voters take into account when calibrating a criminal justice 
regime. 
Relatedly, democratizers argue that a jurisdiction should internalize the 
financial costs of its criminal policies. 129  This idea acts as a check on 
jurisdictions by preventing them from instituting policies that they 
themselves would not want to pay for. But why stop at monetary costs? If 
the goal is to prevent negative externalities, then a jurisdiction should also 
internalize the practical costs of its criminal policies. When Neighborhood 
A enacts harsher criminal laws and enforcement policies, it shifts the 
practical cost of these policies—displaced crime—to Neighborhood B. But 
displacement is seemingly incompatible with cost internalization because 
displacement shifts costs outside of a jurisdiction by nature, so there is a 
tension in advocating for both neighborhood governance and cost 
internalization. 
Second, displacement could lead to a “race to the bottom,” in which 
neighborhoods perpetually raise their criminal penalties in fear of becoming 
the most crime-friendly area. 130  In the above robbery hypothetical, 
Neighborhood B could respond by raising its own penalties to the same level 
as or higher than Neighborhood A. But this approach risks creating “an arms 
race between local communities attempting to drive crime to their 
neighbors.” 131  After Neighborhood B responds with harsher penalties to 
reduce the newly increased rates of robbery, the crime flows back into 
Neighborhood A. Then Neighborhood A responds with even harsher 
sanctions, and so on. Crucially, the protectionist mentalities of the two 
neighborhoods may lead to much harsher criminal justice policies than the 
residents of each locality may have chosen absent the risk of displacement. 
And while the residents in this scenario are still determining what they want, 
they are only doing so to preempt the threat of another locality determining 
it for them. Instead of creating criminal laws based on their own values, the 
residents of both neighborhoods are driven by a fear of losing an arms race 
with the other. 
Admittedly, displacement and diffusion can occur even when criminal 
law is made on a larger scale. There is even some evidence of displacement 
occurring on a statewide level,132 and the policies of areas near borders will 
 
 129 See, e.g., Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1705 (proposing “[c]ost [i]nternalization,” where 
“[t]he county or other political unit with the authority to decide whether and how to prosecute or sentence 
an individual should also bear the financial costs of prosecuting or carrying out the sentence, subject to 
safeguards to correct for resource disparities among communities” (emphasis omitted)). 
 130 Teichman, supra note 90, at 1834, 1859. 
 131 Id. at 1834. 
 132 Id. at 1848–49 (describing how Oklahoma drug laws displaced crime to neighboring states). 
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always risk displacing crime to other jurisdictions. But there is good reason 
to believe that the chances of displacement and diffusion increase as the size 
of a jurisdiction decreases. Research suggests that people typically commit 
offenses close to their homes.133 More to the point, a case study found that 
diffusion and displacement were most evident in the areas immediately 
adjacent to the jurisdiction that increased its policing or penalties, and further 
analyses found that the rates decayed with increased distance.134 Because 
people seeking to commit crimes are less likely to travel great distances to 
find more favorable jurisdictions, displacement and diffusion are much 
greater risks at the neighborhood level than at larger levels of government. 
4. Statewide or Citywide Control Tailored to Certain Neighborhoods 
In addition to neighborhood governing bodies such as neighborhood 
councils, neighborhood-level control could also take the form of tailored 
state- or city-level governance—where a state or city creates policies that 
apply only to a certain neighborhood.135 Tailored state- or city-level control 
circumvents the need for neighborhood governments altogether by asking 
the existing state legislature, city council, governor, or mayor to make law 
and enforcement decisions according to the will of each neighborhood. This 
option may even guard against some risks created by neighborhood 
governments. A state legislator, for example, is better positioned to consider 
the risk of displacement and diffusion because they also represent 
surrounding neighborhoods. That said, tailored state- or city-level 
governance is not a viable alternative to neighborhood self-governance—in 
fact, tailored control is the least democratic means of neighborhood 
governance. Tailored control creates three interrelated issues: there is a lack 
of true representation, the state or city policies are imbued with a false sense 
of legitimacy, and neighborhood voters lack a political remedy. Taken 
together, these issues illustrate how the will of the neighborhood is elusive 
and difficult for state or city actors to ascertain. 
First, the neighborhood views conveyed to the state legislature will not 
necessarily be representative of actual neighborhood views. Tailored control 
 
 133 Wim Bernasco & Paul Nieuwbeerta, How Do Residential Burglars Select Target Areas? A New 
Approach to the Analysis of Criminal Location Choice, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 296, 310 (2005). This 
research further corroborates several empirical studies which “found that the likelihood of an offender’s 
choosing a particular target decreases with the distance of the target from his home.” Id. at 299. 
 134 Shane D. Johnson, Kate J. Bowers, Chris Young & Alex F.G. Hirschfield, Uncovering the True 
Picture: Evaluating Crime Reduction Initiatives Using Disaggregate Crime Data, CRIME PREVENTION 
& COMM. SAFETY 7, 7–16 (2001). 
 135 Professor Ouziel proposed a similar arrangement, in which state legislatures would craft laws 
tailored to cities. Ouziel, supra note 67, at 2323. Because of the impracticality of neighborhood self-
governance, state- or city-level governance tailored to neighborhoods is one alternate avenue that 
neighborhood-level democratization might take.  
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requires a state or city legislature to, in some way, ask the neighborhood what 
it desires. But the tavern owner has different interests from the priest; the 
homeowner from the homeless person; the senior citizen from the 
teenager.136 Tailored control creates an ambassador problem—who speaks 
for the neighborhood? 
The most obvious solution to the ambassador problem is town halls 
because they provide a theoretically open forum for neighborhood residents 
to communicate their needs to state-level representatives. Unfortunately, 
town halls have two big problems: they amplify the loudest voices in the 
room, and already-dominant groups disproportionately participate in them.137 
These two problems are well documented in community policing literature138 
and were further explored in a recent study on neighborhood zoning boards. 
Researchers found that residents who are older, male, long-term residents, or 
homeowners tend to participate more in neighborhood zoning boards than 
other groups. 139  This “participatory bias” then translates into a greater 
opportunity to influence government officials. 140  Town halls on criminal 
justice run the risk of relaying similarly unrepresentative messages to 
legislatures.  
Another possible solution to the ambassador problem is something 
democratizers have already suggested: a citizen advisory board. 
Democratizers envision advisory committees that “include a diverse mixture 
of lay citizens . . . [and] community leaders,” who would “aid legislatures in 
the process of crafting substantive and procedural criminal law.”141 But given 
the array of divergent interests in a neighborhood, could we ensure that these 
boards are appropriately representative?142 Assuming the ambassadors are 
picked at random, there is no guarantee that they would be representative. Of 
course, if a statistically significant number of ambassadors were picked at 
random, we could be fairly confident that the results would be representative. 
But a state would probably not run hundreds of trials for a citizen advisory 
 
 136 See Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 1082 (“Property owners, tenants, shopkeepers, senior citizens, 
teenagers, and the homeless have divergent interests,” so “[w]ho speaks for this ‘community?’”). 
 137 See Rappaport, supra note 16, at 749–50 (“In short, participatory democracy will always favor 
those who have the time and wherewithal to participate, and the human capital to dominate.”). 
 138 See, e.g., HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 146 (1977) (“[P]ersons representing 
special interests, such as the business community, become the strongest voices through the default of 
others.”); WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN 
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 107–09 (1990) (finding that white people and property owners were more 
likely to participate in community policing programs). 
 139 Katherine Levine Einstein, Maxwell Palmer & David M. Glick, Who Participates in Local 
Government? Evidence from Meeting Minutes, 17 PERSPS. ON POL. 28, 33–34 (2019). 
 140 Id. at 37–39. 
 141 Kleinfeld et al., supra note 11, at 1699. 
 142 See Schulhofer, supra note 41, at 1082. 
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board for practical and financial reasons. Alternatively, if the ambassadorial 
positions were voluntary, citizen advisory boards would suffer from the same 
problem as town halls: those who can and want to participate likely hold 
views that are not representative of the neighborhood at large.143 To be sure, 
it is possible for a state to accurately discern what a neighborhood wants 
without using ambassadors. The state could, for instance, conduct reliable 
polling or simply guess correctly. Even in those unlikely events, tailored 
state- or city-level governance is still inherently flawed because of the issues 
of false legitimacy and the lack of a political remedy. 
Second, town halls or citizen advisory boards could attach undue 
legitimacy to the laws or enforcement decisions they produce. Although 
these laws or decisions are likely to be unrepresentative, as explained above, 
some courts and scholars argue that laws made according to a 
neighborhood’s will deserve increased deference.144 Recall that Professors 
Kahan and Meares argue that the Supreme Court should have granted 
deference to a city ordinance in Chicago v. Morales because it was supported 
by Black local leaders and community organizations.145 Theirs is only one 
side of the story. As Professors Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer 
note, the ordinance was far from unanimously endorsed by the city’s Black 
community. The ordinance was drafted by white aldermen, was denounced 
by both Chicago’s leading Black newspaper and its NAACP chapter, and 
saw more Black aldermen vote against it than for it.146 State- or city-level 
decisions tailored to particular neighborhoods may masquerade as legitimate 
exercises of the will of those neighborhoods, regardless of whether they 
actually are, which threatens to provide these decisions with an undeserved 
layer of protection in courts. 
Third, the false legitimacy accompanying tailored governance would 
also decrease the likelihood of a political remedy for erroneous decisions. 
Under ordinary voting conditions, if a legislature passes a law based on an 
inaccurate understanding of its constituents’ preferences—possibly because 
of an unrepresentative town hall or advisory board—then voters have a 
remedy available: they can communicate their true preferences at the voting 
 
 143 See supra notes 137–140 and accompanying text. 
 144 See Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
133, 169 (2017) (“Courts typically defer widely to local enactments, particularly on matters relating to 
land use or school control, on the grounds that such decisions embody the collective will of the 
community.”). 
 145 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. 
 146 Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock Rights: A 
Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 217–20; see also Dorothy E. 
Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 822–26 (1999) (surveying the conflicting community opinions). 
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booth through the candidates they choose. But suppose that, because of a 
believed neighborhood preference, a state legislature enacts a law that only 
applies to a certain neighborhood.147  Those community members can no 
longer respond by voting out the representatives who enacted the law 
because they lack the voting power to do so. Even though the law applies 
uniquely to their community, the neighborhood’s voters make up only a tiny 
fraction of the statewide voting population. 
Such a situation parallels a phenomenon that election law scholars call 
“lockup,” in which political structures make it difficult for voters to change 
the status quo despite popular support for the change.148 The classic example 
is when incumbents entrench themselves in office by gerrymandering their 
districts to give themselves a safe majority. What was before a 51%–49% 
district in favor of the incumbent becomes a 90%–10% district. If the 10% 
oppose the gerrymander, no political remedy is available to them because 
they no longer hold the voting power to remove the incumbent in favor of a 
representative who will redraw the map back to its pre-gerrymandered 
state.149 State- or city-level governance tailored to neighborhoods entrenches 
laws similarly to how gerrymandering entrenches politicians because 
neighborhood voters do not have enough voting power on a statewide level 
to elect or pressure representatives to change the law. 
The only avenue for a political remedy is if the rest of a state’s voters 
know that the law at issue is unrepresentative of the neighborhood that the 
law affects and help the disenfranchised neighborhood by voting for 
candidates who will repeal the law. But statewide voters are unlikely to know 
whether a law is representative of a neighborhood. They may not know that 
the law exists in the first place and, if they do, the law may enjoy a false 
sense of legitimacy unless voters know that town halls, advisory committees, 
and other methods of assessing a neighborhood’s views are susceptible to 
misinterpretation. Not to mention that even assuming statewide voters know 
all this, they may still prioritize other interests. 
Even if the state correctly interpreted the will of the community when 
it enacted the law, the political process effectively locks a neighborhood into 
 
 147 The same effect would occur if a city enacted a law applicable only to a certain neighborhood. 
 148 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648–49 (1998) (first identifying and defining political lockup); see also 
Jarret A. Zafran, Note, Referees of Republicanism: How the Guarantee Clause Can Address State 
Political Lockup, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1418, 1421 (2016) (“Lockup describes a system where the rules and 
structures of politics have made changing the status quo more difficult than it should be considering 
majoritarian preferences.”). 
 149 For an argument that the courts should play a greater role when the political process is unable to 
provide a remedy for gerrymandering, see Colgrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 567, 572 (1946) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
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that choice. If the neighborhood’s voters change their mind in the future, they 
lack the voting power to convince a state legislature to overturn or modify 
the law. When neighborhood-specific law is made on a statewide or citywide 
level, policymakers get one bite at the apple. After that, political lockup 
makes a remedy unlikely. Worse yet, policymakers must often take that bite 
with their eyes closed because of the dubious nature of town halls and 
advisory boards. 
C. State or Federal Institutions 
Given that neighborhood governance is not viable, we turn next to the 
status quo: state or federal governance. Unfortunately, this too is plagued by 
representational issues. To be sure, state and federal institutions score better 
than neighborhood institutions on the second and third factors—inclusion 
and displacement. Because state and federal jurisdictions are larger and 
contain fewer borders than a nation full of neighborhood-level institutions, 
the risks of underincluding relevant voters and displacing crime decrease—
there are simply fewer adjacent areas to displace crime into and fewer worthy 
voters to exclude.150 But state or federal governance brings its own baggage 
when it comes to preference maximization. Owing to a sharp rural–urban 
political divide in the United States, such large jurisdictions do not maximize 
voters’ criminal-justice-policy preferences. 151  So while neighborhood 
governance suffers from jurisdictions that are too small, state or federal 
governance suffers from jurisdictions that are too large. 
A centralized jurisdiction, such as a state or nation, must represent a 
wide array of voters, so it struggles to capture the diverse needs of each 
smaller community included within it. This is even truer in the United States 
today because of a large rural–urban divide in which the views of people in 
rural areas differ sharply from the views of people in urban areas. There is 
almost a perfect correlation between an area’s population density, or how 
urban it is, and its political affiliation.152 Unsurprisingly, urban areas tend to 
 
 150 State- or federal-level institutions do, however, run the risk of overincluding voters. See infra 
notes 187–189 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Scharff, supra note 87, at 1491–93 (emphasizing that decentralization obviates the concern 
“that rural state legislators are voting on policies that affect urban residents and urban state legislators are 
voting on policies that affect rural residents”). 
 152  Stahl, supra note 144, at 139; Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—the Urban 
Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 292–97 (2016) (describing the 
rural–urban divide and noting that “density of an area’s population is an extraordinary predictor of which 
way it will vote in a presidential election”); see also BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING 
OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 202–05 (2008) (describing the relationship between 
political affiliation and population density during George W. Bush’s presidential campaigns); Richard 
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be more liberal, while rural areas tend to be more conservative.153 What is 
more, the rural–urban divide might even extend beyond the ballot box. 
According to some scholars, political parties represent not only political 
views but also cultural norms. Professors Christopher Achen and Larry 
Bartels, for example, “argue that parties are all-encompassing social groups,” 
not just collections of people with common political views. 154  Another 
scholar “similarly argues that today’s partisan divisions represent competing 
lifestyles with . . . mutually opposed . . . cultures, beliefs, interests, politics, 
and geography.”155 
Can we infer from this division of political views a comparable rural–
urban divide on criminal justice reform? The data suggest we can. True, there 
is some agreement among Republicans and Democrats on criminal justice 
issues, such as reducing the prison population.156 But even on this fairly 
 
Florida, America’s Class-Divided Electorate, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Oct. 27, 2016, 11:52 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/what-divides-clinton-and-trump-voters-class-
and-culture [https://perma.cc/W6QT-ASEE] (describing the relationship between political affiliation and 
population density during Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton’s presidential campaigns); Alan Greenblatt, 
Beyond North Carolina’s LGBT Battle: States’ War on Cities, GOVERNING (Mar. 23, 2016), https:// 
www.governing.com/archive/gov-states-cities-preemption-laws.html [https://perma.cc/A22Y-4XMR] 
(“[T]raditional regional rivalries almost perfectly align with partisan divisions.”). 
 153 Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health? Implications of Scale and Structure, 
91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219, 1262–65 (2014) (discussing the left-leaning preferences of big-city residents); 
Jonathan A. Rodden, The Long Shadow of the Industrial Revolution: Political Geography and the 
Representation of the Left 60 (Mar. 25, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://web.stanford.edu/ 
~jrodden/wp/shadow.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V4D-YXEQ] (finding that “a relatively tight correlation 
between population density and left voting is quite ubiquitous in industrialized societies” and tracing the 
pattern back to residential behaviors during the Industrial Revolution); BISHOP, supra note 152, at 202–
05 (discussing the rural trend toward conservatism). Consider, for example, the rising Democratic support 
in cities and suburban areas that helped Democrats flip Georgia in the 2020 general presidential election 
and senatorial runoff elections. See Jan Nijman, Georgia’s Political Shift: A Tale of Urban and Suburban 
Change, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/cities/articles/2020-
11-09/georgias-political-shift-a-tale-of-urban-and-suburban-change [https://perma.cc/J3S5-ZTX3]. This 
is not to diminish the important role that many rural communities of color played in the elections. See 
Jim Burress, Experts Deconstruct How Georgia’s Rural Communities of Color Delivered for Democrats 
in November, Senate Runoffs, WABE (Jan. 12, 2021), https://www.wabe.org/experts-deconstruct-how-
georgias-rural-communities-of-color-cemented-a-democratic-victory-in-november-senate-runoffs/ 
[https://perma.cc/6T7Z-7JNB]. 
 154  Stahl, supra note 144, at 149 (citing CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, 
DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 307 
(2016)). The divide even extends to how one thinks. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS 
MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 3–4 (2012) (arguing that liberals 
and conservatives have entirely different intuitions about right and wrong). 
 155 Stahl, supra note 144, at 149 (citing BISHOP, supra note 152, at 22–23). 
 156  According to a study conducted on behalf of the ACLU, “81% of Democrats, 71% of 
Independents and 54% of Republicans” agree that “it is important for the country to reduce its prison 
populations.” Danny Franklin, ACLU Nationwide Poll on Criminal Justice Reform, ACLU (July 15, 
2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/aclu-nationwide-poll-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/EJC5-
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bipartisan topic,157 there is still a 27% difference between Democrats and 
Republicans.158 Even among those who agree the prison population should 
be reduced, Democrats and Republicans often have different motives—such 
as reducing incarceration itself versus reducing government spending. 159 
Partisan division likely lies just beneath the surface of this supposedly 
bipartisan topic. 
Take Illinois as an example: 55% of Illinois residents agree that “[t]he 
criminal justice system is biased against black people,” while 35% 
disagree.160 Mapping these results against location shows that the rural–urban 
divide exists on a spectrum—the farther respondents were from a city, the 
less they tended to agree with the statement. The poll found 63% agreement 
among Chicago residents, 60% agreement among residents of Chicago’s 
suburbs, and only 42% agreement among downstate residents.161 Reflecting 
on the results, Professor John Jackson noted that “race, party, and place of 
residence are driving forces in shaping the voters’ views on bias in the 
criminal justice system” and that “many Illinois voters live in two different 
worlds when it comes to matters of race and contact with the criminal justice 
system.”162 Researchers identified a similar trend, though less steep, when 
 
EE74]; see also id. (finding that “87% of respondents agree that drug addicts and those with mental illness 
should not be in prison, [and that] they belong in treatment facilities”). 
 157 See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391 (Dec. 21, 2018) (codified in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 34 U.S.C.) (reforming federal prisons and sentencing laws, among other 
things). This act is recognized as a “culmination of a bi-partisan effort.” An Overview of the First Step 
Act, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/fsa/overview.jsp [https://perma.cc/3PC8-
AXCU]. 
 158 See Franklin, supra note 156 (conducting a nationwide poll on criminal justice reform). 
 159 Shaila Dewan & Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Cannot Agree on Absolutely Anything. 
Except This., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/prison-reform-bill-
republicans-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/VLZ5-BJET]. Similarly, even Democrats and Republicans 
who opposed the First Step Act of 2018 did so for diametrically opposed reasons. Republican Senator 
Tom Cotton, for example, argued that the legislation would lead to increased crime by letting offenders 
out of prison early. See German Lopez, The First Step Act, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:42 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/12/18/18140973/state-of-the-union-trump-first-step-act-
criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/GLU3-WVAY]. On the other hand, a number of prominent 
Democrats, like Senator Dick Durbin and Congressman John Lewis, initially opposed the bill because it 
did not go far enough in reforming sentencing. See Justin George, Is the “First Step Act” Real Reform?, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (May 22, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/05/22/is-the-first-step-
act-real-reform [https://perma.cc/E6SX-W65G]. 
 160 Illinois Voters Have Strong Views on Major Issues Facing the State: Simon Poll, SIU NEWS (Mar. 
19, 2018), https://news.siu.edu/2018/03/031918-simon-poll-state-issues.php [https://perma.cc/NQA6-
5VNW] [hereinafter Illinois Voters Have Strong Views]. 
 161 Id. The study also showed division along partisan and racial lines: 73% of Democrats agreed, 
compared with only 29% of Republicans; 50% of white voters agreed, compared with 79% of Black 
voters and 63% of Hispanic voters. Id. 
 162 Id. 
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they asked voters if the state should remove barriers that make it more 
difficult for previously incarcerated people to find work.163 
Federal-level governance may contain an even sharper rural–urban 
divide. Voting data show there are fewer moderates in heavily conservative 
states, which suggests there may be an even greater disagreement on criminal 
justice issues between rural residents of more conservative states and urban 
residents of more liberal states than between rural and urban residents within 
the same state. 164  This would make federal-level governance even less 
representative than state-level governance because representatives are forced 
to compromise between an even larger array of diverse interests and needs.  
That said, the rise of political polarization—with parties primarily 
appealing to the extremes—might render the differences between the federal 
and the state levels small. Research suggests that politics is increasingly a 
zero-sum game rather than an exercise in appealing to a middle ground: 
political parties seek to maximize the preferences of their ideological bases, 
rather than represent the preferences of the entire voting jurisdiction. 
According to Professor Kenneth Stahl, both major parties have given up on 
compromise “and have instead devoted their resources to achieving victory 
through demography”—a fight not over the issues but over the franchise of 
voting itself.165 The most notable example is the recent wave of legislation in 
Republican-controlled states that makes it more difficult to vote. 166  The 
upshot? Republican legislators answer almost exclusively to rural residents 
and Democratic legislators answer almost exclusively to urban residents. 
Each set of representatives is thus incentivized only to represent its base.167 
Such a system inefficiently realizes policy preferences, since it does so only 
for very particular groups. The premise of self-determination—voters have 
 
 163 The poll found that 80% of Chicago voters and 77% of suburban Chicago voters agreed, but only 
71% percent of downstate voters agreed. Id. 
 164 Political Ideology by State (2014), PEW RSCH. CTR. (2014), https://www.pewforum.org/religious-
landscape-study/compare/political-ideology/by/state/ [https://perma.cc/YQ4B-DP74] (showing that 
more conservative states tend to have a greater proportion of conservative voters to moderate voters). 
 165 See Stahl, supra note 144, at 159–61 (noting that both Republicans and Democrats in power have 
enacted voting rules that benefit their party). 
 166  See Ryan P. Haygood, Hurricane SCOTUS: The Hubris of Striking Our Democracy’s 
Discrimination Checkpoint in Shelby County & the Resulting Thunderstorm Assault on Voting Rights, 
10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. S11, S35–S49 (2016) (surveying voting restrictions in Republican-controlled 
states, such as polling-place closures and voter-roll purges); see also State Voting Bills Tracker 2021, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-
reports/state-voting-bills-tracker-2021 [https://perma.cc/9B84-RDY9] (finding that over 361 bills to 
restrict voting access are in circulation in forty-seven states as of March 24, 2021). Democrats, on the 
other hand, “have responded by attempting to expand the [voter] pool” to include people such as convicted 
felons. Stahl, supra note 144, at 160. 
 167 See Stahl, supra note 144, at 154. 
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control over policy choices that affect them—is surely offended if small sets 
of voters are making policy choices on behalf of the voting pool at large. 
But the rural–urban divide is not necessarily a negative feature of our 
democracy. There are practical reasons why it exists. Rural and urban voters 
might not just want different criminal laws but need different laws. Take gun 
control as an example. As Professor Shawn Fields argues, there may be good 
reasons why firearm laws should be different in rural and urban areas.168 
Rural residents use firearms for activities that are not possible in urban areas, 
such as hunting and outdoor target shooting, and use different types of 
firearms than urban residents.169 Most notably, rural gun owners use firearms 
for self-defense in different ways from urban gun owners.170 In urban areas, 
gun owners favor a concealable weapon “to provide short-term deterrence 
until law enforcement can arrive.”171 But in rural areas, gun owners instead 
must “supplement” traditional law enforcement in “fast-moving life-and-
death situations” because law enforcement takes longer to arrive—
something that might require more than a concealable handgun.172 So rural 
residents use different firearms, in different ways, and for different reasons. 
Making gun-control laws on a federal or state level, then, cannot possibly 
maximize both urban and rural residents’ gun-control preferences. There are, 
of course, sound reasons to have uniform gun laws—such as preventing 
people from buying guns in rural areas and taking them back to urban areas—
but preference maximization is not one of those reasons. 
The rural–urban divide places representation in tension with federal or 
state governance. Rural and urban residents have distinct preferences, 
sometimes driven by distinctly different realities. Self-determination 
therefore necessitates a unit of governance smaller than federal- or state-level 
institutions to more efficiently maximize policy preferences but a unit large 
enough to reduce the risks of displacement and lack of inclusion. 
III. INTERMEDIATE INSTITUTIONS 
The drawbacks of neighborhood, state, and federal governance inform 
what the democratic ideal would look like. Superior institutions would better 
maximize policy preferences, encapsulate a transient populace, and prevent 
displacement between jurisdictions. These institutions do, in fact, exist. This 
Note defines them as “intermediate-level” institutions, which includes 
 
 168 Fields, supra note 81, at 474–76. 
 169 Id. at 474. 
 170 Id. at 474–75 (“[G]eographical variance informs how [the Second Amendment right to self-
defense] will be exercised.”). 
 171 Id. at 475. 
 172 Id. 
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county and regional governments. In the urban context specifically, a 
regional legislature—rather than a city or county legislature—is the most 
democratically sound institution to make or enforce criminal law. 
The intermediate level includes jurisdictions that are larger than a 
neighborhood but smaller than a state—units such as counties, regions, or 
major cities. This Part does not seek, however, to label units as intermediate 
or not, but instead to define the qualities of intermediate institutions. 
Classifying particular institutions as intermediate requires a case-by-case 
approach because we assign similar labels to dissimilar institutions. For 
example, the City of Chicago has a population of just under 2.7 million, 
while the City of Vidalia has a population of just over 10,000.173 One is a 
dense Midwestern urban area, while the other is located in rural south 
Georgia. Even though both are cities, each area predictably has distinct 
representational needs, so considering them together is unhelpful. The most 
democratically sound institutions satisfy a few self-determination factors, 
but depending on geography, the types of units (cities, counties, or regions) 
that satisfy these factors will vary. 
Importantly, no single institution represents the ideal. The intermediate 
level is generally more representative than the neighborhood, state, and 
federal levels. Although they are not perfect, after considering a series of 
tradeoffs, intermediate institutions represent the best-fit model for 
representation in criminal lawmaking and enforcement decisions. Even 
choosing among intermediate institutions involves tradeoffs.  
The focus of this Part is threefold. First, it explains why intermediate 
institutions are a better choice than neighborhood, state, or federal 
institutions. Second, it catalogues the tradeoffs made when selecting among 
intermediate institutions. Finally, this Part explores how regional governance 
would work in practice. 
A. The Relative Appeal 
From a representational perspective, intermediate-level institutions are 
better suited to control criminal lawmaking and enforcement than 
neighborhood, state, and federal institutions. 
 
 173  Compare QuickFacts: Chicago City, Illinois, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/chicagocityillinois,US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/ 
JG6E-56M6] (estimating that Chicago’s population is 2,693,976), with QuickFacts: Vidalia City, 
Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/vidaliacitygeorgia/ 
HSG495219 [https://perma.cc/C225-PQEL] (estimating that Vidalia’s population is 10,402). 
116:561 (2021) Identifying the Most Democratic Institution 
597 
1. Versus Neighborhood-Level Institutions 
Intermediate-level institutions possess two chief advantages over 
neighborhood-level institutions: they are better equipped to include a 
transient populace and less likely to displace crime between jurisdictions. 
As to inclusion, the larger a jurisdictional boundary is drawn, the lower 
the chance that residency restrictions will disenfranchise nonresidents who 
deserve a voice in a jurisdiction’s criminal justice policy-making.174 Self-
determination requires that individuals can influence the policies that affect 
them, so a jurisdiction must include those who are active within its 
boundaries. Data suggest that the average person’s day-to-day scope of 
activity exceeds the boundaries of a neighborhood but not that of a broader 
unit, such as a region. In 2017, a person’s average trip distance to or from 
work in the United States was 12.2 miles.175 The average distances to the 
store (7.9 miles), errands (7.9 miles), school or church (7.0 miles), and social 
activities (11.4 miles) were all similar.176 Other research shows that people 
embarking on trips of this length are likely to travel through more than one 
neighborhood, at least in urban areas. The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention found that the average distance an urban resident travels to a food 
establishment is only 2.6 miles.177 But even when urban residents travel only 
2.6 miles, they reach different neighborhoods in approximately two-thirds of 
those trips.178 This suggests that other daily activities with greater average 
trip distances, such as going to work or school, also take people out of the 
neighborhoods they live in. Intermediate-level jurisdictions encompass this 
transience between neighborhoods but not at a size that would fall prey to 
the preference-maximization problems posed by the rural–urban divide, such 
as state- or federal-level institutions would. Placing the power to make 
criminal laws with an intermediate-level legislature therefore allows people 
to have a say in the criminal laws governing the areas that they spend time 
in on a day-to-day basis. 
 
 174 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (describing inclusion). 
 175  U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., SUMMARY OF TRAVEL TRENDS: 2017 
NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD TRAVEL SURVEY 17 (2018), https://nhts.ornl.gov/assets/2017_nhts_summary_ 
travel_trends.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H3E-5TCF]; see also ELIZABETH KNEEBONE & NATALIE HOLMES, 
METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS, THE GROWING DISTANCE BETWEEN PEOPLE AND JOBS IN 
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 3 (2015) (finding that the average commute distance in Atlanta is 12.8 miles). 
 176 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 175, at 17. 
 177 Jodi L. Liu, Bing Han & Deborah A. Cohen, Beyond Neighborhood Food Environments: Distance 
Traveled to Food Establishments in 5 US Cities, 2009–2011, PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE, Aug. 2015, 
at 1, 1 (finding a standard deviation of 3.7 miles). 
 178 Id. (measuring neighborhoods by neighborhood census tracts).  
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As to displacement, intermediate institutions are less likely than 
neighborhood institutions to displace crime by virtue of their larger size.179 
Research suggests displacement is less likely to occur as jurisdictional size 
increases.180 Intermediate institutions could, of course, still displace crime—
even state-level jurisdictions have been shown to do so.181 But the risk of 
displacement is severely lessened between entire cities or regions, as 
opposed to small neighborhoods.182 
Intermediate-level governance derives its two advantages over 
neighborhood governance—inclusion and displacement—largely because of 
its size. This raises the question: why doesn’t state- or federal-level 
governance come with the same advantage over intermediate-level 
governance? As it turns out, bigger is not always better. 
2. Versus State- and Federal-Level Institutions 
Intermediate-level institutions are also more representative than state or 
federal institutions. As to preference maximization, intermediate institutions 
avoid the sharp rural–urban divide from which state and federal institutions 
suffer because intermediate institutions can cover urban and rural areas with 
separate governance structures.183 Recall that political affiliation and views 
on criminal justice reform tightly track population density.184 Most states 
divide into three main units of density—rural, suburban, and urban—which 
all have distinct viewpoints.185 Polling data on both political ideology and 
criminal justice reform suggest that these views exist on a spectrum: cities 
are the most left-leaning, suburbs are also left leaning but not as heavily, and 
rural areas are right leaning.186 So three distinct groups exist, and two of those 
 
 179 See supra Section II.C (discussing the reduced risk of displacement at the state or federal level in 
comparison to the neighborhood level). 
 180 See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. 
 181 Teichman, supra note 90, at 1848–49 (describing how Oklahoma drug laws displaced crime to 
neighboring states). 
 182  See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text (describing the increased risk of displacement 
in smaller jurisdictions). 
 183 For a greater discussion of the rural–urban divide and the problems it creates, see supra Section 
II.C.  
 184 See supra notes 152–163 and accompanying text. 
 185 UNIV. OF CHI. HARRIS PUB. POL’Y & ASSOC. PRESS-NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFFS. RSCH., HOW 
THE URBAN/RURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE PLAYS OUT IN AMERICA’S SUBURBS 4 (2019) [hereinafter UNIV. 
OF CHI. HARRIS PUB. POL’Y], https://apnorc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/UChicagoHarrisAp 
NorcPoll2_Final-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YV7B-FKWT] (finding that 42% of rural residents are 
Republicans, while 28% are Democrats; 39% of suburban residents are Republicans, while 46% are 
Democrats; and 17% of urban residents are Republicans, while 58% are Democrats). 
 186  See id.; see also notes 148–151 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of 
“lockup”—when political structures entrench the status quo despite majoritarian support for change—as 
applied to popular desire for criminal justice reform). 
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groups are significantly different from the third. Institutions that group all 
three together, as states and nations do, are a poor fit to maximize the 
preferences of all three groups. By contrast, an intermediate institution—
such as a city, county, or region—can represent a single group and thus more 
easily maximize its preferences. While intermediate institutions will never 
perfectly capture groups with homogenous viewpoints, they are small 
enough to capture a rural or metropolitan area with greater precision, 
avoiding the extreme divides that state and federal institutions capture. By 
representing discrete subsets of people, which we know exist with a degree 
of empirical certainty, intermediate institutions can make it so that voters are 
no longer forced to settle for either an unsatisfactory compromise or a 
winner-takes-all approach. 
As to inclusion, intermediate institutions also capture relevant voters 
with greater precision because state and federal institutions are 
overinclusive. Recall that data show that people’s average trip distances are 
around twelve miles and under. 187  While many people commute from 
suburbs to a city, which will be addressed in more detail below,188 the data 
suggest people’s daily activity is at most regional in scope, not statewide or 
nationwide. For example, in surveying the distances people commute to 
work in ninety-six large metropolitan areas, one study found that no area 
registered a median higher than 12.8 miles.189 
Although displacement might, on its face, seem to weigh in favor of 
states because displacement decreases as size increases,190 research suggests 
that displacement might tail off after the intermediate level. In other words, 
there might not be much difference between intermediate-level displacement 
and state-level displacement. Because research suggests that offenders are 
less likely to commit crimes the farther they are from their routine spaces or 
homes, the chances of displacement might be negligible by the time a city, 
county, or regional boundary is reached.191 That said, there is no denying that 
the risk of displacement is always heightened near jurisdictional borders—
and intermediate governance would create more borders than state 
governance. The federal level, containing only borders with other countries, 
is likely then the safest from a displacement perspective. But whether either 
 
 187 See supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text. 
 188 See infra Section III.B.2. 
 189 KNEEBONE & HOLMES, supra note 175, at 20–21. 
 190 See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. Recall, however, that displacement does not 
disappear altogether at the statewide level. See Teichman, supra note 90, at 1848–49.  
 191 See Johnson et al., supra note 134, at 14 (“[D]isplacement . . . would be expected to peak in . . . 
adjacent areas and decay across greater distances.”). 
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state- or federal-level governance causes meaningfully less displacement 
than intermediate-level governance is less clear from existing research. 
Representational self-determination in criminal law finds its sweet spot 
in the middle. At either end—hyperlocal or hyperbroad—representation 
scores poorly. But at the intermediate level, representational principles peak. 
B. Which Intermediate Institution Is Best? 
One question remains: which institution within the intermediate 
category best represents voters? Again, this analysis is guided by the three 
self-determination factors: preference maximization, inclusion, and 
displacement. These factors—not a particular institution—should be the 
starting point for any inquiry into representational democracy in criminal 
law. The United States is a diverse country with geography, demographics, 
and needs that vary from place to place. Applying the three factors in one 
location might yield a different result than in another.  
This Note does not contend that cities, counties, or regions are best able 
to represent people in all circumstances—after all, even institutions with the 
same name can describe vastly different places, such as the City of Chicago 
and the City of Vidalia. Instead, the point of this Note is to lay out 
considerations that can be applied on a case-by-case basis. Such an approach 
circumvents a central problem in the democratization movement: defining a 
“community.”192 Because intermediate institutions are identified on a case-
by-case basis, we do not need a one-size-fits-all definition of community—
flexibility in identifying a community and its unique needs is already built 
into intermediate institutions.  
But there are patterns. The case-by-case analysis yields a consistent 
result in metropolitan areas, where regional governance best represents 
voters. In rural areas, which are less uniform, county or regional legislatures 
are likely to best represent voters. This Section concludes by discussing the 
practical realities of regional governance and what criminal justice reformers 
can do with these findings. 
1. Rural Institutions 
A county or regional government will, in general, best represent voters 
in rural areas.193 But because population differs widely from place to place in 
 
 192 See supra Section I.B. 
 193 In accordance with the U.S. Census, this Note considers rural areas to have a population of less 
than 50,000. See Defining Rural Population, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., https://www.hrsa.gov/ 
rural-health/about-us/definition/index.html#:~:text=Under%20this%20definition%2C%20about%2021, 
is%20still%20classified%20as%20rural [https://perma.cc/WA5G-VMPN] (describing rural areas as 
those with fewer than 50,000 people and those which do not qualify as an urban cluster with between 
2,500 and 50,000 people in a concentrated area). 
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rural America, a uniform solution is both unlikely and undesirable. Instead, 
we must use a more flexible approach to best represent rural voters, 
especially when homogenous groups exist across county lines.  
As a starting point, rural institutions should not be treated coequally 
with urban institutions bearing the same name—or even with other rural 
institutions bearing the same name. For example, the urban neighborhood of 
Hyde Park in Chicago has more than twice as many residents as the rural 
City of Vidalia, despite the fact Hyde Park is formally a smaller unit of 
governance.194 There are also important differences between rural and urban 
areas beyond population. Rural cities and towns are often geographically 
larger than urban neighborhoods, which means they often do not possess the 
same level of risk of underinclusion or displacement as an urban 
neighborhood with the same number of residents.195  
Next, although the choice should depend on the unique factors of each 
rural area, counties are a reasonable place to begin the inquiry. Most rural 
counties feature a population with high levels of agreement, allowing county 
governance to maximize preferences, and an area large enough to reduce 
displacement.196 As to inclusion, according to census data, “30% of rural 
residents commute 30 minutes one way to work and 4% travel as much as 
90 minutes.”197 These data seem to suggest that rural people’s daily scope of 
activity exists largely within one county. So according to the self-
determination factors, county-level governance is likely a good fit in many 
rural areas. 
But we need not stop there. Perhaps a political jurisdiction that does not 
currently exist would represent voters even more efficiently. Indeed, some 
rural areas might warrant an outside-the-box solution. Imagine a large, 
politically homogenous group of people that is evenly distributed among two 
adjacent counties, where either county’s jurisdiction standing alone would 
 
 194  Compare UNIV. OF CHI. MED., COMMUNITY PROFILE: HYDE PARK 1 (2019), 
https://www.uchicagomedicine.org/-/media/pdfs/adult-pdfs/community/chna-community-profiles/hyde-
park-community-profile.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Y7V-WMTN] (estimating that Hyde Park’s population is 
26,573), with QuickFacts: Vidalia City, Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/vidaliacitygeorgia/HSG495219 [https://perma.cc/J6CT-25MK] (estimating that 
Vidalia’s population is 10,402 as of 2019). 
 195  See supra Sections II.B.2–II.B.3 (describing the inclusion and displacement risks in urban 
neighborhoods). 
 196 See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text (describing the high levels of political agreement 
in rural areas); see also supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text (describing the reduced risk of 
displacement as jurisdictional size increases). 
 197  See Opinion, Getting from Here to There in Rural America—Solutions for the Carless, 
APOLITICAL (Dec. 12, 2018), https://apolitical.co/solution-articles/en/getting-from-here-to-there-in-rural-
america-solutions-for-the-carless [https://perma.cc/W4VK-BWEX]. 
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insufficiently represent the group according to the three factors. Here, the 
best possible jurisdiction is a regional one.198 
How, then, should we decide when to use county governance and when 
to use regional governance in rural areas? To decide between the two, states 
must poll rural areas or make use of data already available in resources such 
as the census.199 Rural areas are presently difficult to represent only because 
without area-specific data, it is difficult to predict ex ante how best to 
represent each area—more data on an area’s criminal justice preferences, 
general scope of activity, and displacement will make the choice easier as 
states make these case-by-case determinations. Of course, collecting these 
data would create financial costs. But costs that drastically improve the 
efficacy of our democratic system are worth bearing. After all, if our system 
does not adequately represent voters on an issue as critical as criminal justice 
reform, then it is not much of a democratic system at all. 
2. The Urban–Suburban Problem: Toward a Regional Government 
In metropolitan areas, instead of city or county governments, regional 
governments are best equipped to represent voters. In line with previous 
scholarship, a region is defined as a jurisdiction that covers a metropolitan 
area,200 which is an area containing a large population nucleus—a city of 
50,000 or more people—“with adjacent communities having a high degree 
of economic and social integration with that” nucleus.201 In other words, a 
region covers a city and its suburbs. While proposals for regional 
 
 198 As shown in the next Section, a regional government is sometimes necessary to best represent 
voters. See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing regional governance in metropolitan areas). 
 199 See MICHAEL RATCLIFFE, CHARLYNN BURD, KELLY HOLDER & ALISON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, DEFINING RURAL AT THE U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 3 (2016), https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/ 
reference/ua/Defining_Rural.pdf [https://perma.cc/58V7-R3Y7] (discussing the ways in which rural 
communities are delineated in the census). 
 200 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 3. 
 201 Metropolitan and Micropolitan: About, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2020), https://www.census.gov/ 
programs-surveys/metro-micro/about.html [https://perma.cc/7JFX-PPSJ]. 
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governments are rare202 and actual regional governments are rarer,203 states 
can delegate power to these institutions under their constitutional home rule 
powers.204 This Section describes why regional governments are up to the 
task of leading criminal justice reform, and the next Section describes what 
regional governments could look like. 
First, although preference maximization could weigh against regional 
representation, any negative effects can be mitigated. Suburban voters create 
a representational headache for regional representation—and as “perhaps the 
largest single bloc of the electorate in many states,”205 they are an important 
group to represent. Generally, views of suburban voters track population 
density, meaning denser suburbs are more left leaning. Indeed, suburbs 
closer to cities tend to vote for Democrats, while suburbs farther away from 
cities tend to vote for Republicans.206 The difference in views could also vary 
among metropolitan areas. In a metropolitan area like Chicago, for example, 
a regional government would not maximize preferences significantly less 
than the city government. Recall that in the poll discussed in Section II.C—
where voters were asked two questions about criminal justice—there was 
only a 3% disagreement between urban and suburban voters.207 Other areas, 
however, likely have higher levels of disagreement between their cities and 
suburbs. A nationwide poll found that 39% of suburban residents are 
Republicans, while 46% are Democrats, and that 17% of urban residents are 
 
 202 Briffault, supra note 50, at 6 (“Proposals for full-fledged regional governments are rare, but 
regionalists regularly call for new regional processes, structures, or institutions that can identify regional 
problems, formulate regional solutions, implement those solutions, and coordinate regional actions over 
a wide range of policy domains.” (footnote omitted)). For examples of such proposals, see DAVID RUSK, 
CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 85 (1993) (advocating for metropolitan governments as a “much better 
[alternative] than trying to get multiple local governments to act like a metropolitan government” because 
they have a “more lasting and stable framework for sustained, long-term action”); Thomas A. Brown, 
Democratizing the American Dream: The Role of a Regional Housing Legislature in the Production of 
Affordable Housing, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 599, 601 (2004) (calling for the creation of a regional 
housing legislature).  
 203 Portland, Oregon’s Metropolitan Service District is the only elected regional government in the 
United States. See What Is Metro?, OR. METRO, https://www.oregonmetro.gov/regional-leadership/what-
metro [https://perma.cc/QC2K-3WK8] (“Metro . . . bec[ame] the nation’s first directly elected regional 
government.”); Carl Abbott, Metro Regional Government, OR. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Mar. 17, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/ZV3C-4J6Z] (“Metro has remained the only directly elected regional government for 
any United States metropolitan area.”); see also RUSK, supra note 202, at 104 (describing the district). 
The Twin Cities in Minnesota also have a regional government, although not an elected one. See Who We 
Are, METRO. COUNCIL, https://metrocouncil.org/About-Us/Who-We-Are.aspx [https://perma.cc/CAV4-
D787]. 
 204 See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text (describing state constitutional home rule powers). 
 205 Stahl, supra note 144, at 139 n.23. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See Illinois Voters Have Strong Views, supra note 160. 
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Republicans, while 58% percent are Democrats.208 And because political 
affiliation is correlated with views on criminal law,209 disagreement in other 
metropolitan regions may be greater than in Chicago. When a city and its 
suburbs do not share high levels of agreement, a state might face a choice 
between representing people only in their places of residence, with one 
government for the city and one for the suburbs—which runs afoul of 
inclusion but maximizes policy preferences—or representing people across 
their entire daily scope of activity with a regional government—which 
potentially decreases preference maximization.  
These challenges to preference maximization, however, can be 
mitigated with precise line drawing. The facts that population density heavily 
correlates with political preferences and that suburbs closer to cities are more 
liberal 210  can inform where a state draws the boundaries of regional 
governments. States can also directly measure preference maximization by 
polling the areas in question. Alternatively, states could allow cities and 
suburbs to self-sort by giving them the choice to opt in or out of metropolitan 
governments through a vote. This might result in two, or possibly more, 
regional governments in a metropolitan region: one encompassing a city and 
its most similar nearby suburbs and the other encompassing a city’s more 
conservative and more distant suburbs. 
Second, a regional government is superior to a city or county 
government largely because of inclusion: regional governments best capture 
the daily movements of voters in metropolitan areas. Rather than spending 
their lives in one city or neighborhood, people tend to move across cities 
within a region.211 Today, regions—not cities—function as labor markets, 
housing markets, and customer bases.212 Modern travel data illustrate this, 
showing a substantial flow of two groups of people between cities and 
suburbs. The first group—traditional commuters—travel from a suburb to a 
city. For example, Manhattan’s population nearly doubles in the daytime,213 
 
 208 See UNIV. OF CHI. HARRIS PUB. POL’Y, supra note 185, at 4. 
 209 See supra notes 156–163 and accompanying text. 
 210 See Stahl, supra note 144, at 139 n.23. 
 211 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 3 (“[P]eople . . . do not concentrate their daily lives within any 
one locality but, rather, regularly move back and forth among multiple municipalities across a region.”); 
see also Neal Peirce, Regionalism and Technology, 85 NAT’L CIVIC REV. 59, 59 (1996) (“[M]etropolitan 
regions—‘citistates’[—]are the true cities of our time . . . .”). 
 212 See Briffault, supra note 50, at 3 (“[B]usinesses look to the region, rather than to the localities in 
which they are located, for their suppliers, workers, and customers.”). 
 213 See Emily Badger, The Most Important Population Statistic that Hardly Ever Gets Talked About, 
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (May 30, 2013, 2:33 PM), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2013/05/ 
most-important-population-statistic-hardly-ever-gets-talked-about/5747/ [https://perma.cc/6HQG-7FCP] 
(reporting that, based on American Community Survey data collected between 2006 and 2010, 
Manhattan’s daytime commuter-adjusted population is 3,083,102). 
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Washington, D.C.’s increases by 78% percent and Boston’s by 40%.214 The 
second group—reverse commuters—travel from a city to a suburb. Reverse 
commuters comprise 4.8 million members of the U.S. population, according 
to the Census Bureau.215 In Philadelphia, for example, over 146,000 workers 
reverse commute each day.216 Because people no longer confine their lives 
to one city, the inclusion factor counsels for regional representation over 
municipal representation.  
Inclusion also favors regional representation over county 
representation. Although a county may, in some instances, capture both a 
city and its suburban areas, counties cannot do so with the tailor-made 
precision of regional governments. For example, Cook County covers 
Chicago and some, but not all, of its suburbs.217 And Fulton County covers 
part of Atlanta and some of its most populous suburbs, such as Alpharetta 
and Roswell,218 but not much of Atlanta’s eastern half or other populous 
suburbs, such as Marietta.219 Unlike with counties, which were drawn before 
the economic and social scope of modern life developed, we can draw 
regional government lines according to the modern realities of metropolitan 
populaces to include as many relevant voters as possible. 
Lastly, displacement may not heavily affect the choice between a 
regional government and a city or county government.220 True, regions are 
by nature bigger than the cities they include, so displacement—which is 
dependent mostly on size—may marginally decrease at the regional level.221 
 
 214  LYNDA LAUGHLIN, PETER MATEYKA & CHARLYNN BURD, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CHARACTERISTICS OF DAYTIME URBAN COMMUTERS FOR 20 U.S. CITIES: GENDER, WORK, AND FAMILY 
4 fig.1 (2015) (displaying commuter-adjusted population change in twenty U.S. cities); see also Census 
Bureau Reports 253,000 Workers Commute into Philadelphia County, Pa., Each Day, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/archives/2013-pr/cb13-r20.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4MF7-5V2R] (reporting that 27.4% of Philadelphia workers commute outside the county where 
they live). 
 215  Why More People Are Commuting from Cities to Suburbs, JLL (June 25, 2018), https:// 
www.us.jll.com/en/trends-and-insights/cities/why-more-people-are-commuting-from-cities-to-suburbs 
[https://perma.cc/X9BA-N4HJ]. 
 216 See id. 
 217 See Rich Reinhold, New Standards and Geographic Definitions for Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas, ILL. DEP’T OF EMP. SEC., https://www2.illinois.gov/ides/lmi/Pages/New_Standards_and_ 
Geographic_Definitions.aspx [https://perma.cc/HZZ8-UM9E]. 
 218  See Fulton County Cities, FULTON CNTY., https://www.fultoncountyga.gov/inside-fulton-
county/cities-in-fulton-county [https://perma.cc/8RX3-QVN9]. 
 219  See id.; Voting Districts Maps Viewer, FULTON CNTY., https://gismaps.fultoncountyga.gov/ 
portalpub/apps/webappviewer/index.html?id=c9290d15d93148eab7412de12ba45629 [https://perma.cc/ 
8FVT-445T]. 
 220 See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text (describing displacement). 
 221 See id. (describing displacement). 
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But, as discussed, the effects of displacement may already be negligible by 
the time jurisdictions are drawn on an intermediate level.222 
On balance, a regional legislature is best positioned to represent 
metropolitan voters. The second and third factors—inclusion and 
displacement—favor regional institutions. Preference maximization, on the 
other hand, weighs less certainly in favor of regional governance, but the 
damage to preference maximization at the regional level can be mitigated 
through careful line drawing or by allowing cities and suburbs to self-sort 
into regional legislatures. 
C. Regional Governance in Practice 
In theory, regional governments are among the best suited institutions 
to reform the criminal justice system, especially in metropolitan areas—but 
what would they actually look like? Regional governments could take the 
form of regional legislatures or regional compacts between existing city 
governments. Realistically, the chances of governments adopting such 
schemes might be slim. That reality does not, however, lessen the importance 
of recognizing regional governments as often the most democratic 
institutions to lead criminal justice reform. Instead, the reasons that regional 
governments are democratically sound institutions should inform our 
decisions about criminal justice reform at whatever level it takes place 
because they shed light on what democratizing entails in different settings. 
The first form that regional governance could take is a regional 
legislature. Examples of regional governments already exist in Portland, 
Oregon and the Twin Cities in Minnesota. The Portland Metropolitan 
Service District (Metro), which covers Portland and twenty-three other 
nearby cities, is the only elected regional government in the United States.223 
Metro received a home rule charter in 1992224 and manages the region’s 
waste, growth, and parks, among other things.225 The Twin Cities have a 
similar government—albeit not an elected one—called the Metropolitan 
Council. The Metropolitan Council consists of seventeen representatives, 
one from each district in the region, who are appointed by the Governor of 
Minnesota.226 The council establishes policies on city planning, transport, 
and sewage, among other things, and it even has the power to supersede local 
government laws, although it does not have the power to make criminal law 
 
 222 See Johnson et al., supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 223 See What Is Metro?, supra note 203 (describing Portland’s Metro). 
 224 RUSK, supra note 202, at 104. 
 225 See What Is Metro?, supra note 203. 
 226 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.123 (West 2014). 
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or enforcement decisions.227 Given the range of authority both these regional 
governments have, it is not difficult to imagine the creation of specialized 
regional governments that can make criminal law or criminal enforcement 
decisions. Regional governments could consist of existing elected 
representatives from major cities and the suburbs they share high levels of 
agreement with or, much like Portland’s Metro, representatives elected 
specifically to serve on the regional government.228 
Another option is regional compacts—agreements between cities or 
counties. Regional compacts already exist and, because they incorporate 
existing governance structures rather than create new ones, they might be 
easier to implement. Take, for example, the Southeast Florida Regional 
Climate Change Compact—a compact between counties in Florida to 
develop legislative programs that mitigate climate change. 229  States, too, 
regularly form compacts with other states to coordinate legislation. 230 
Consider Portland again. Under a regional compact, instead of forming an 
elected regional government as they did, the local governments of Portland 
and each of its twenty-three suburbs could simply enter into an agreement to 
jointly craft and enforce criminal justice policies, such as police body-
camera requirements or use-of-force protocols. Regional compacts reach the 
same result as formal regional governments—preference maximization of 
likeminded metropolitan voters, inclusion of all voters active in the region, 
and a decreased likelihood of displacement owing to the size of the region—
but they might be more palatable to states unwilling to change the status quo 
and institute entirely new regional governance institutions. With regional 
compacts, localities need only enter into agreements they can leave at any 
point, and the state need not commit to full-scale institutional change. 
Some might argue that regardless of institutional inertia, both 
proposals—regional governments and regional compacts—are infeasible 
because they would create confusion for law enforcement, who would have 
to enforce multiple criminal codes. But this concern is unlikely and easily 
avoidable. Police departments already operate at the city, county, and state 
levels, and state police typically enforce only laws that are outside the 
 
 227 See id. § 473.129. 
 228 See What Is Metro?, supra note 203 (noting that the council consists of a president, who is elected 
regionwide, and six councilors elected by district). 
 229  See What Is the Compact?, SE. FLA. REG’L CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT, https:// 
southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/about-us/what-is-the-compact/ [https://perma.cc/6DJK-DABG] 
(describing the compact). 
 230  See generally JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, INTERSTATE COOPERATION: COMPACTS AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS 75–147 (2d ed. 2002) (surveying the many interstate compacts from 
criminal to environmental to tax law). 
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jurisdiction of city or county police.231 When cities or counties form regional 
governments or compacts, they could take into consideration whether their 
new jurisdiction maps onto existing law enforcement jurisdictions—after all, 
police departments belong to the very bodies that would be part of the 
regional governments or compacts. For example, if the greater Chicago area 
formed a regional government, it could include entire jurisdictions—such as 
the City of Chicago and the City of Evanston—that already have their own 
law enforcement departments, rather than splitting cities or counties down 
the middle. This is all to say that, with proper planning, regional governance 
is unlikely to pose jurisdictional problems greater than those that already 
exist under existing state and local governance structures. 
Admittedly, instituting regional governments or compacts would 
require a radical overhaul of our political structures. But before we dismiss 
them, consider two points. First, should we care if criminal justice reform 
requires a radical change to our political structures? The status quo, in which 
voters are shoehorned into arbitrarily drawn districts, is not necessarily 
desirable. And although we are used to such a system, it is not even much of 
a status quo, historically speaking.232 Professor Charles Tiebout famously 
proposed the idea of “voting with your feet”: if you do not like your local 
laws, you can simply move to a jurisdiction with better ones.233 As many have 
pointed out, this proposal is detached from reality because people do not, and 
often cannot, move on a whim.234 So let’s flip it on its head—if voters cannot 
move to the right jurisdiction, move the right jurisdiction to them. A 
representative democracy represents we the people, not the land on which 
we live. As the way in which we live changes, our jurisdictional boundaries 
might, from time to time, need to change with us. Not to mention, if regional 
 
 231 See Fraser Sherman, Difference Between a State Trooper & a Sheriff, CHRON. (June 28, 2018), 
https://work.chron.com/difference-between-state-trooper-sheriff-22502.html [https://perma.cc/9SA9-
V64E]; see also William A. Geller & Norval Morris, Relations Between Federal and Local Police, 
15 CRIME & JUST. 231, 242 (1992) (emphasizing that police responsibilities are fragmented by 
geographical jurisdiction). Some states even confine the jurisdiction of state police by law. See, e.g., GA. 
CODE ANN. § 35-2-32 (West 2021) (confining the primary role of state police to public roads and 
highways). 
 232 Robert T. Ford, Law’s Territory (a History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 843 (1999) 
(“[T]erritorial jurisdictions—the rigidly mapped territories within which formally defined legal powers 
are exercised by formally organized governmental institutions—are relatively new . . . developments.”). 
 233  Schragger, supra note 53, at 1550 & n.64, 1557 (2019) (attributing the concept to Professor 
Tiebout but noting that Professor Tiebout did not coin the term “voting with your feet”); see also Tiebout, 
supra note 53, at 419; Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In 
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 776 (1995) (“If I dislike the laws of my home 
state enough and feel tyrannized by them enough, I always can preserve my freedom by moving to a 
different state with less tyrannous laws.”). 
 234 See e.g., Schragger, supra note 53, at 1548–51 (arguing that most firms and workers do not or 
cannot move due to various constraints). 
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governance is the most democratic avenue for criminal lawmaking, perhaps 
future scholarship will show that it is also the most democratic institution for 
other areas of law and policy, making the radical change even more 
worthwhile. 
Second, even without a radical change in governance structures, this 
Note should be instructive to any reform contemplated at the neighborhood, 
state, or federal level because it has examined the deficiencies in each. An 
awareness of those deficiencies will aid lawmakers and activists in crafting 
laws and enforcement policies through more democratic means. Rather than 
charging into democratization with our eyes shut, we must be acutely aware 
of what democratization entails in each jurisdictional setting and how 
different jurisdictions affect avenues for criminal justice reform on the 
ground. 
CONCLUSION 
The democratization of criminal justice—if calibrated at the right 
level—would produce a more democratic criminal justice system than the 
one we have today. But that’s a big “if.” The level of governance at which 
reform takes place is critical to democracy because it mediates the amount 
of representation afforded to voters in the criminal lawmaking process. As 
the disregarded voices of so many cry for changes in our criminal justice 
system, there is no time like the present to institute more democratic 
structures to ensure that those voices are heard.235 But we must change in the 
right way. 
To choose the right institution to make and enforce criminal law, we 
must understand the tradeoffs inherent in our decisions. Smaller institutions, 
like neighborhood councils, are underinclusive and threaten to displace or 
diffuse crime. Larger institutions, like state or federal governments, create 
representational dilemmas because of a sharp rural–urban divide in 
viewpoints. Now is the time—at least in the criminal justice sphere—to think 
about capturing voter interests in an outside-the-box manner: on a regional 
level. The United States is no longer comprised of residents of one state or 
another, or of one neighborhood or another, but of rural residents, suburban 
residents, and urban residents. These residents no longer travel short 
distances by horse and carriage; they commute, shop, and socialize across 
many smaller areas, all in a single day. Given this new reality, the best way 
to optimize democracy in criminal law is to administer it at a regional level. 
  
 
 235 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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